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ABSTRACT 
 As the war on drugs enters the 50th year, illegal drug profits continue to support 
terrorism and human trafficking, discarded drug boats are leaking fuels into the seas, and 
drug traffickers are using evolving technology, including semi-submersibles, 
narco-torpedoes, and full submarines. By analyzing the threat, the technology, and U.S. 
counterdrug policy and strategy, this thesis offers the Navy four necessary capabilities for 
a counterdrug vessel. The Navy and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) need speed 
and the ability to support Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDET) and 
helicopter interdiction tactical squadrons (HITRON), as well as to deploy aircraft and 
rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB). Weighing the littoral combat ship (LCS) and the 
expeditionary fast transport (EPF) class, the thesis finds that the LCS is suitable for the 
counterdrug mission, especially if implemented with critical safety fixes, but the EPF 
alone is unsuitable. The thesis recommends a creative solution: use the LCS and EPF 
together to support the fight against drug traffickers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Drug trafficking is a lucrative enterprise, which has led to a rise in drug trafficking 
organizations (DTO) throughout Central and South America. DTO’s raîson d’être severely 
impacts the United States’ national security. Since President Nixon declared drugs enemy 
number one in 1971, the United States has increasingly fought the war on drugs, involving 
multiple agencies and international partners to defeat a common threat.1 The threat is the 
drug trade—the combination of illegal drugs, drug producers, and drug traffickers.2 
Because the drug trade primarily originates from Central and South America then flows 
through the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean into the United States, and because DTOs 
continuously evolve the means by which they traffic their dangerous wares, the threat is 
both a U.S. national security issue and a maritime security priority. 
The maritime region over which most drug trafficking occurs encompasses over six 
million square miles across a transit zone that comprises the waters in the Eastern Pacific, 
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea.3 Between 60 and 65 percent of the cocaine 
smuggled into the United States passes through the eastern portion of the Pacific and 
Central America passageway while the remaining 35 to 40 percent transits across the 
Caribbean island chain.4 DTOs are extremely versatile in methods of transporting drugs 
across borders, whether through the sea, air, or land. However, trafficking drugs by sea is 
fast, cheap, offers multiple points of entry into the United States, and potentially eliminates 
 
1 “A Brief History of the Drug War,” Drug Policy Alliance, accessed August 10, 2021, 
https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war. 
2 Peter Chaveriat, “Counter-Narcoterrorism Operations in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean 
Operations Areas from 1970 through 1990” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2010), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524429.pdf. 
3 James Hull and Michael Emerson, “High ‘Seize’ Maritime Interdiction Works!,” United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, January 1, 1999, 65, https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/205995325/fulltext/48C9D557F0C64CC7PQ/1?accountid=12702. 
4 Peter Chalk, Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response, (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2011), xi, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/
RAND_MG1076.pdf. 
2 
the need for numerous middlemen, the use of which can decrease DTOs’ profits and 
increase the risk of seizure.  
Because DTOs prioritize the sea, the United States and its partners must maintain 
maritime domain awareness in the Western Hemisphere5 and classify contacts of interest, 
a complex and difficult necessity that requires the appropriate supporting assets and the 
logistics for their deployment. To succeed in drug interdiction, the United States must be 
able to “detect, control, and engage drug smugglers out at sea.”6 Detection alone poses 
serious challenges: a drug interdiction vessel operating alonewith reliable intelligence 
that indicates the presence of a possible drug trafficking boat within its operating areahas 
only a roughly 4 to 5 percent chance of detecting the drug trafficking boat.7 With an 
embarked helicopter, the detection rate increases to 30 percent.8 Even if detected, 
interception is far from guaranteed.  
Cuts to and problems with U.S. assets, resources, and budgets are severely 
impinging the effort. In the last five years, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has 
experienced deep budget cuts that have negatively affected its ability to support its missions 
and lines of effort. In a 2020 Senate Armed Serves Committee (SASC) hearing, 
SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Craig S. Faller states, “USSOUTHCOM absorbed 25 
percent cuts to our personnel, a 10 percent reduction to our exercise program, and a steady 
decline in available assets and forces.”9 The need for cost-effective resources has increased 
but is not new. During his tenure as SOUTHCOM commander General John F. Kelly 
 
5 Hull and Emerson, “High ‘Seize’ Maritime Interdiction Works!” 64. 
6 Hull and Emerson, 65.  
7 John Stryker, “Narcosubmarines: Nexus of Terrorism and Drug Trafficking?,” Center for 
International Maritime Security, January 11, 2018, http://cimsec.org/narcosubmarines-nexus-terrorism-
drug-trafficking/35223. 
8 Stryker. 
9 Posture Statement of Admiral Craig S. Faller Commander, United States Southern Command, 116th 




stated, “I simply sit and watch [drug trafficking] go by.”10 A strategic way to help solve 
this problem is to find the right small surface combatant (SSC) asset for counterdrug 
operations, potentially allowing a larger naval presence in the SOUTHCOM area of 
responsibility (AOR).11 To determine what SSC assets work best requires an 
understanding of which capabilities the assets need to successfully interdict DTOs.  
This thesis, therefore, examines the following question regarding two existing SSC 
platforms. Are littoral combat ship (LCS) and expeditionary fast transport (EPF) platforms 
suited for the drug interdiction mission?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The United States has reached a critical turning point in counterdrug operations 
because the United States Navy (USN or Navy) platforms traditionally used for drug 
interdiction have reached the end of their operational life. Until 2015, the Navy primarily 
utilized the Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP) Frigate as the workhorse for drug interdiction 
throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR. However, the Navy decommissioned the last frigate in 
2015, leaving a maritime asset gap that means the Navy has no surface asset solely 
dedicated to counterdrug operations.12 The Navy has recently utilized the Arleigh Burke-
class Destroyer (DDG) to fill the void,13 but, in an era of great power competition, 
deploying DDGs on counterdrug missions may not be the most efficient use of a naval 
platform needed elsewhere, such as in the waters near Iran, Russia, and China.  
 
10 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for 
Drug Smuggling Purposes,” U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015, 7, 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=cgu_facbooks. 
11 Sam LaGrone, “Low Cost Ship Options for U.S. Navy’s Drug War,” USNI News, March 20, 2013, 
https://news.usni.org/2013/03/20/low-cost-ship-options-for-u-s-navys-drug-war. 
12 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Won't Reactivate Perry Frigates for SOUTHCOM Mission; Will Send Ships 
to Fight Drug War in 2018,” USNI News, December 11, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/12/11/secnav-
memo-navy-wont-reactivate-perry-frigates-southcom-mission-will-send-ships-fight-drug-war-2018. 
13 Sam LaGrone, “Destroyers Continue to Prowl 4th Fleet As Coast Guard, Navy Rack Up $1B in 
Drug Seizures,” USNI News, July 2, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/07/02/destroyers-continue-to-prowl-
4th-fleet-as-coast-guard-navy-rack-up-1b-in-drug-seizures. 
4 
The core challenge has been finding a multi-purpose platform suitable for maritime 
drug interdiction. The United States has tested the use of an LCS for counterdrug efforts,14 
and, in 2017, the Navy also auditioned the EPF class to supplement the LCS.15 Although 
both classes of ships have demonstrated success in the open ocean to detect, monitor, and 
interdict drug boats and submarines, Congress and other stakeholders have concerns over 
their design, procurement, and survivability.16 For example, EPFs have suffered bow 
damage in the high seas due to a design flaw, leaving them susceptible to wave slams.17 
As a cost measure, Congress has limited the Navy’s LCS production, and initially reduced 
the inventory from 52 to 40,18 and then again to 35.19 Additionally, neither ship is expected 
to be survivable in combat and so would fail to meet multi-purpose criteria; the EPF was 
designed as a cargo ship with little armor or armament20 while a 2011 operational test 
determined that the “LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat 
environment.”21  
 
14 “LCS In Action Against An Armed Enemy,” U.S. Navy, accessed November 8, 2020, 
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lcs1/Pages/LCSInActionAgainstAnArmedEnemy.aspx. 
15 Brittney Cannady, “USNS Spearhead Conducts Narcotics Detection, Monitoring as Part of SPS 
17,” Military News, August 18, 2017, https://www.militarynews.com/norfolk-navy-flagship/news/
top_stories/usns-spearhead-conducts-narcotics-detection-monitoring-as-part-of-sps-17/article_c548d0ce-
0bd8-5d2f-83d0-21b759313641.html. 
16 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress, CRS Report No. RL33741 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 3 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf. 
17 Rich Miller, “Bows of Navy’s Fast Transports Easily Damaged, Need Reinforcement,” 
Professional Mariner, April 29, 2016, https://www.professionalmariner.com/bows-of-navys-fast-
transports-easily-damaged-need-reinforcement/. 
18 Christopher Cavas, “Pentagon Cuts LCS to 40 Ships, 1 Shipbuilder,” Defense News, December 6, 
2015, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2015/12/17/pentagon-cuts-lcs-to-40-ships-1-shipbuilder/. 
19 Richard Sisk, “New Law Restricts the Navy to 35 Littoral Combat Ships,” Military News, 
December 23, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/12/23/new-law-restricts-navy-35-littoral-
combat-ships.html. 
20 Grace Jean, “Aluminum ‘Truck’ Joint High Speed Vessel: Great Potential, But Questions Remain,” 
National Defense 95, no. 688 (March 2011): 34–36, https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/
858093550/fulltext/45964D216B354A79PQ/1?accountid=12702. 
21 Sebastien Roblin, “Here Is Why the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships Punch below Their 
Weight,” The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/here-why-the-us-navys-littoral-
combat-ships-punch-below-23042. 
5 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The thesis provides a two-section literature review. The first section reviews the 
scope of drug trafficking. The second section reviews debates regarding the SSC ship types 
the Navy has so far utilized in the drug-interdiction mission in the SOUTHCOM AOR.  
1. The Drug Trafficking Problem 
The 2020 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) articulates the importance of 
defeating the drug trafficking threat since “almost all of the illicit drugs causing American 
deaths are produced outside the United States and trafficked across the Nation’s borders 
and through the international mail and express consignment carriers.”22 Thus, American 
citizens are exposed to heroin, cocaine, and other illegal drugs that destroy thousands of 
lives every year.23 According to researchers from the University of Pennsylvania, “Since 
1971, America has spent over a trillion dollars enforcing its drug policy. Yet many 
observers, both liberal and conservative, say the war on drugs has not paid off.”24 
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, over $600 billion is spent annually 
strictly on substance abuse costs with a possibility of increasing.25 Statistics from the Drug 
Policy Alliance highlight that from 1999 to 2019, the number of reported overdose deaths 
increased exponentially from 16,849 to 71,130.26 
Furthermore, drug trafficking provides both international and domestic DTOs a 
way of supporting corruption, destabilizing U.S. partner nations, and also funding an 
 
22 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2020), 17, https://legislativeanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2020-ONDCP-National-
Drug-Control-Strategy.pdf. 
23 Office of National Drug Control Policy, 17–18. 
24 Nathaniel Lee, “America Has Spent over a Trillion Dollars Fighting the War on Drugs. 50 Years 
Later, Drug Use in the U.S. Is Climbing Again,” CNBC, June 17, 2021, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/17/the-us-has-spent-over-a-trillion-dollars-fighting-war-on-drugs.html. 
25 “Is Drug Addiction Treatment Worth Its Cost?,” National Institute on Drug Abuse, accessed August 
10, 2021, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-
guide-third-edition/frequently-asked-questions/drug-addiction-treatment-worth-its-cost. 
26 “Drug War Statistics,” Drug Policy Alliance, accessed August 10, 2021, 
https://drugpolicy.org/issues/drug-war-statistics. 
6 
assortment of other illicit undertakings.27 The United Nations states that “Drug trafficking 
accounts for half of all transnational organized crime proceeds providing a constant source 
of funding for other criminal activities and even threats such as terrorism.”28 
Research indicates that the opportunities for trafficking illicit drugs into the United 
States are vast and challenging to manage, particularly regarding heroin and cocaine, and 
the geography alone gives a sense of why. Figure 1 depicts the various drug trafficking 
routes for the movement of cocaine from Central and South America into the United States.  
 
Figure 1. Movement of Cocaine into the United States29 
 
27 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, 18. 
28 Interpol, “On Global Anti-Drug Trafficking Day INTERPOL and WCO Highlight the Pandemic’s 
Multiplying Effect on Illicit Activities,” June 26, 2020, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/
News/2020/On-global-anti-drug-trafficking-day-INTERPOL-and-WCO-highlight-the-pandemic-s-
multiplying-effect-on-illicit-activities. 
29 Source: Clare Seelke et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. 
Counterdrug Programs, CRS Report No. R41215 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2011), 3, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf. 
7 
Donald Mabry gives numerical data on methods of transit into the United States that helps 
puts this management problem into perspective. Annually, over 250 million people transit 
across the U.S. borders, over 25 million air passengers arrive across 500,000 airline flights, 
8 million cargo containers enter U.S. ports, and over 100 million parcels transit across the 
country.30 Filtering this amount of traffic every year to separate the innocent from the 
malicious is an enormous task. 
The supply of illicit drugs entering the United States from the Western Hemisphere 
primarily originates from Colombia and Mexico. According to the 2019 National Drug 
Threat Assessment, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reports that “almost 90 
percent of cocaine seized and tested in the United States originated from Colombia.”31 In 
addition, the threat assessment lists Mexico as a significant producer of marijuana, with 
over 300,000 kilograms seized by the California Border Patrol in 2018.32 The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes that cocaine and heroin is smuggled from South 
America to Mexico by sea, shipped through complex land routes, and ultimately reaches 
North American markets.33 On-site drug eradication is failing, allowing cultivation to 
increase, and the air-bridge denial program in Colombia has seen only minimal success, 
making maritime interdiction that much more crucial.34  
Sam Lagrone notes that cartels have increased their transportation of illegal drugs 
into the United States over the last decade: cartels have been trafficking large “amounts of 
cocaine by the sea, using complex, multi-million-dollar, custom drug boats, which are very 
 
30 Donald Mabry, “The US Military and the War on Drugs in Latin America,” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (1988): 54–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/165979. 
31 U.S. Department of Justice, 2019 Drug Enforcement Administration: National Drug Threat 
Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2019), 60, 
https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/2019-NDTA-final-01-14-2020_Low_Web-DIR-007-
20_2019.pdf. 
32 U.S. Department of Justice, 77. 
33 United Nations, “Drug Trafficking,” United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed 
November 17, 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html. 
34 Adam Isacson, “Restarting Aerial Fumigation of Colombia Drug Crops Is a Mistake,” WOLA, last 
modified March 7, 2019, https://www.wola.org/analysis/restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-crops-in-
colombia-is-a-mistake/. 
8 
difficult to detect.”35 Submarine expert H.I. Sutton clarifies the reality: “These days, narco-
subs typically carry about 1.5 tons of cocaine split into 1 kg bricks and then bundled 
together into bales...much of their hull is actually taken up with fuel to give them an 
incredible range of more than 2,000 miles.”36 The increase in range means not only trouble 
for the United States but also for Europe. The International Criminal Police Organization 
and the World Customs Organization see the increased drug flow coming into Europe as a 
critical concern affecting the region.37 In a briefing paper, Mikael Wigell and Mauricio 
Romero state, “As the market for cocaine has been contracting in North America, Central 
and South American drug networks have switched their attention to Europe, which is now 
the world’s fastest-growing market for cocaine.”38 For the European market, drug 
traffickers smuggle cocaine by sea, either through narco submarines39 or through merchant 
vessel cargo.40 
In five decades of fighting the war on drugs, DTOs have proven seriously, 
cunningly adaptable. The NDCS states that “Law enforcement agencies across all levels 
have achieved considerable success in combating drug trafficking and use, yet traffickers 
continue to refine their methods and adopt new techniques for delivering potent illicit drugs 
to our communities.”41  
 
35 LaGrone, “Destroyers Continue to Prowl 4th.” 
36 H. I. Sutton, “Why The Navy’s Latest Narco Submarine Seizure Is A Big Deal,” Forbes, June 12, 
2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/06/12/why-the-navys-latest-narco-submarine-seizure-is-
important/. 
37 Interpol, “Drug Trafficking and Terrorism Focus of INTERPOL European Regional Conference,” 
May 29, 2019, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2019/Drug-trafficking-and-terrorism-
focus-of-INTERPOL-European-Regional-Conference. 
38 Mikael Wigell and Mauricio Romero, “Transatlantic Drug Trade: Europe, Latin America and the 
Need to Strengthen Anti-Narcotics Cooperation,” The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2013, 
2, https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Transatlantic%20Drug%20Trade.pdf. 
39 H. I. Sutton, “Completely New Type Of Narco Submarine Discovered In The Atlantic,” Forbes, 
August 31, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/31/completely-new-type-of-narco-
submarine-discovered-in-the-atlantic/. 
40 Costas Paris, “Global Shipping Faces Troubling New Smuggling Questions,” Wall Street Journal, 
January 6, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-shipping-faces-troubling-new-smuggling-questions-
11578330634. 
41 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, 17–18. 
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2. SSC Drug Interdiction Vessels in SOUTHCOM 
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower outlines the importance of 
sea services and how the Navy can utilize ships in supporting national, defense, and 
security strategies.42 The strategy dictates that sea services, including the Navy and the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG or Coast Guard), interdict and board vessels trafficking 
illegal materials and personnel.43 According to the strategy, Navy SSC such as the LCS, 
EPF, and Patrol Craft (PC) are to accomplish the goal of protecting U.S. interests in dealing 
with the drug interdiction problem. This second literature review section reviews the 
specifics and the debates over using the LCS, PC, and EPF as drug interdiction vessels. 
a. Littoral Combat Ship 
The Navy commissioned the LCS to replace the OHP frigates, and it was supposed 
to be a multi-mission ship with the capability to “plug-and-fight” various mission modules 
around mine warfare (MIW), surface warfare (SUW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
including unmanned vehicles.44 In his 2003 Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis, 
David Rudko regards the LCS as “an affordable, small, multi-mission ship capable of 
independent, interdependent and integrated operations inside the littorals.”45 The LCS 
program did not, however, go exactly according to plan. According to Congressional 
Research Service reports, production problems and concerns about the hulls involving 
corrosion have severely degraded the LCS program.46 Two LCS variants, the 
Independence and the Freedom, have experienced serious engineering problems, causing 
millions in repair costs to bring these ships back to service. In 2015, the USS Milwaukee 
(LCS-5) experienced a glancing blow to its port and starboard combining gear that caused 
 
42 Department of Defense, U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 2015 Revision 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), https://news.usni.org/2015/03/13/document-u-s-
cooperative-strategy-for-21st-century-seapower-2015-revision. 
43 Department of Defense, 26. 
44 O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program, 2 
45 David D. Rudko, “Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2003), xv, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1069/03Mar_Rudko.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
46 O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program, 2.  
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its high-speed clutches to fail to disengage in time, resulting in it having to be towed back 
to port.47 Then, in 2016, the LCS program experienced its worst year, with four problems 
revolving around hull cracks and engineering failures.48 In addition, the Navy has decided 
to decommission the first four ships in the class to save money for modernizing these hulls 
due to shipbuilding and upgrade costs.49  
However, even with such program setbacks, Navy leaders have praised the LCS 
platforms for successfully executing drug interdiction missions. In his 2019 posture 
statement, Admiral Faller asserts that the LCS is mission fit throughout the SOUTHCOM 
region.50 He also notes that utilizing the LCS in the SOUTHCOM AOR delivers an ability 
and technological advantage against DTOs in the open ocean and that the LCS platform is 
well-suited to intercept drug boats and narco-submarines due to its speed, maneuverability, 
and ability to support aviation efforts.51 Senior military officers such as Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Gilday also view the LCS as a perfect candidate for 
the drug interdiction mission: “I can deploy these things with a law enforcement 
detachment (LEDET), and a signals intelligence capability, and I can do that on LCS with 
carry-on gear,” Gilday opines. “It’s the right kind of platform for that...I’d prefer to do 
them with an LCS instead of a DDG if I can.”52 Gilday also adds that LCS platforms could 
be sent out in mass numbers in the 4th Fleet without the need for a DDG.53 Faller and other 
 
47 Sam LaGrone, “Littoral Combat Ship USS Milwaukee Repairs Could Last Weeks,” USNI News, 
December 15, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/12/14/littoral-combat-ship-uss-milwaukee-repairs-could-
last-weeks. 
48 Hope Seck, “New Details Emerge on Littoral Combat Ship Breakdowns,” Military News, December 
9, 2016, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/12/09/new-details-emerge-on-littoral-combat-ship-
breakdowns.html. 
49 Michael Gilday, “Fiscal Year 2021 Projected Ship Inactivation Schedule,” United States Navy, June 
20, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/NAVADMINs/Message/Article/2277297/fiscal-year-2021-
projected-ship-inactivation-schedule/. 
50 2019 Posture Statement to Congress, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Craig S. Faller, 
USSOUTHCOM Commander), May 1, 2019, https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-
Coverage/SOUTHCOMs-2019-Posture-Statement-to-Congress/. 
51 Faller, testimony on 2019 Posture Statement. 
52 David Larter, “US Navy Prepares Major Surge of Littoral Combat Ship Deployments,” Defense 




officials have publicized the capabilities of the LCS—which include attaining speeds over 
40 knots, being able to launch and recover helicopters, and deploying drones—as a perfect 
vessel of opportunity for the counterdrug mission in the SOUTHCOM AOR.54  
On the other hand, other senior officers such as Vice Admiral Roy Kitchener and 
Rear Admiral Casey Moton note that wear and tear could degrade both ships’ reliability 
and maintainability.55 Kitchener argues that, although the LCS platforms have been 
successful in supporting fleet commanders, their reliability needs improvement: 
Number one, we still continue to have some design problems on some of 
the engineering components on those ships. I think on the maintenance side 
there’s some more work to be done. We’ve now successfully had 
deployments out to 7th Fleet, we’ve had successful deployments to 4th 
Fleet. And we got some good lessons learned, and we need to kind of figure 
out, okay, what is our global maintenance [concept of operations]? We need 
to figure out how are we going to repair these things [moving] forward.56 
In addition to maintenance concerns, retired submarine officer and senior fellow at 
the Hudson Institute Bryan Clark notes the wear and tear the LCS platforms endure, 
especially because of the class’s problematic propulsion architecture.57 Additionally, Clark 
adds that sending LCS platforms overseas requires extensive maintenance once an LCS 
arrives in port, cutting down on deployment times. Ultimately, Clark believes that the 
efforts required to keep the LCS deployable outweigh its mission benefits.58 
 
54 Seth Robbins, “Why Is U.S. Sending Navy Warships to Thwart Drug Smugglers?,” InSight Crime, 
April 27, 2020, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/us-navy-warships-drug-smugglers/. 
55 Megan Eckstein and Mallory Shelbourne, “Naval Surface Forces Kicks Off Follow-On LCS Study 
To Refine Maintenance, Reliability Issues,” USNI News, October 5, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/10/
05/naval-surface-forces-kicks-off-follow-on-lcs-study-to-refine-maintenance-reliability-issues. 
56 Eckstein and Shelbourne. 
57 Larter, “US Navy Prepares Major Surge of Littoral Combat Ship Deployments.” 
58 Larter. 
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b. Cyclone-Class Patrol Ship 
With the decommissioning of the last OHP Frigate in 2015,59 the Cyclone-class 
Patrol Ships (PC) have been the only Navy surface units consistently executing the 
counterdrug mission throughout the Caribbean.60 Of the thirteen active Navy PCs in the 
fleet, USS Zephyr (PC 8), USS Shamal (PC 13), and USS Tornado (PC 14) are based out 
of Mayport, Florida, while the remaining ten are homeported in Manama, Bahrain. With a 
crew of 30 and a length of 179 feet,61 the PCs were designed for coastal patrol, interdiction, 
and surveillance. As Gilbert and Uhls argue, the PCs have demonstrated their value in the 
war on drugs to theater commanders,62 especially in the eastern Pacific Ocean and 
Caribbean.63 The deployments for PCs from Mayport primarily in support of 
SOUTHCOM and the drug interdiction mission serve as an excellent model. Gilbert notes 
that drug smugglers operate in very shallow areas that most naval ships cannot access.64 
To counter this, PC capabilities, such as speed, maneuverability, and size play a critical 
role. 
Although the PCs have demonstrated success in the counterdrug mission, the 
president’s 2021 budget notes the decommissioning of the three PCs in Mayport, leaving 
only the remaining ten forward deployed to Bahrain, therefore reducing the available assets 
to SOUTHCOM.65 For this reason, the thesis does not consider PCs in its analysis. 
 
59 Sam LaGrone, “Last Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate USS Simpson Leaves Service, Marked for 
Foreign Sale,” USNI News, September 29, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/09/29/last-oliver-hazard-perry-
frigate-uss-simpson-leaves-service-marked-for-foreign-sale. 
60 Cameron Ingram and Matthew Arndt, “Patrol Craft Employment In The Caribbean,” Surface 
Warfare Magazine, November 12, 2020, https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/swmag/Pages/Patrol-craft-
employment-in-the-Caribbean.aspx. 
61 Department of the Navy, “Patrol Coastal Ships - PC,” America’s Navy, January 9, 2017, 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2171625/patrol-coastal-ships-pc/. 
62 C.J. Gilbert, “Maritime SOF: Patrol Coastal Ships A Vital Asset to the Theater CINC” (master's 
thesis, Marine Corps War College, 1999), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529635.pdf. 
63 Daniel Uhls, “Does the Fast Patrol Boat Have a Future in the Navy?” (master's thesis, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2002), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a415966.pdf. 
64 Gilbert, “Maritime SOF,” 20. 
65 Gilday, “Fiscal Year 2021 Projected Ship Inactivation Schedule.”  
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c. Expeditionary Fast Transport Ship 
The EPF is a vessel that can be reconfigured to tackle multiple missions. The EPF’s 
speed, size, and reconfigurable design allows theater commanders adaptability in using 
these unique ships. Former 4th Fleet Commanders Rear Admiral Sean Buck and Rear 
Admiral Sinclair Harris view the EPF as a perfect fit for 4th Fleet and SOUTHCOM66 as 
it provides additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support while its 
speed can quickly transport the warfighter to the fight.67 Steven Stacy agrees that an EPF 
in the SOUTHCOM AOR offers Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) an 
additional sensor for detecting and monitoring suspicious vessels.68  
The EPF offers several advantages over other vessels such as the DDG. 
Congressman Bradley Byrnewho represents Mobile, Alabama, where these ships are 
madeargues, “This vessel is truly a Swiss army knife that is able to support a wide range 
of missions for all the services.”69 Byrne believes that the EPF fills a vital asset gap for 
Combatant Commanders, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.70 The Navy notes that EPF 
vessels have deployed to U.S.Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command AORs 
to deliver additional support for the respective Fleet Commanders.71 Captain Todd 
Kutkiewicz, master of the USNS Burlington (EPF 10), views the vessel as providing 
additional support to the fleet, especially when paired with an LCS.72 However, the critical 
advantage, in the view of senior defense advisor at the Shipbuilders Council of America 
Joe Carnevale, is that the EPF frees up other warships to conduct other missions.73 
 
66 LaGrone, “Low Cost Ship Options for U.S. Navy’s Drug War.”  
67 Edward Lundquist, Interview With Rear Adm. Sean Buck, Commander U.S. Fourth Fleet, interview 
by Edward Lundquist, May 7, 2018, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/interview-with-rear-
adm-sean-buck-commander-u-s-fourth-fleet/. 
68 Cannady, “USNS Spearhead Conducts Narcotics Detection.” 
69 "Byrne Advocates for Alabama Shipbuilders During Committee Hearing," March 15, 2016, Bradley 
Byrne, video, 10:18, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnJ8W8oTMaU. 
70 Byrne.  
71 Byrne.  
72 LaShawn Sykes, “USNS Burlington Carries out Proof-of-Concept Testing,” DVIDS, September 27, 
2020, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/378778/usns-burlington-carries-out-proof-concept-testing. 
73 Jean, “Aluminum ‘Truck’ Joint High Speed Vessel,” 35. 
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Furthermore, Jan van Tol, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, adds that the EPF’s shallow draft of 12.5 feet allows it to access coastal 
waters denied to a 30-foot draft DDG.74 However, van Tol also notes that the EPF is 
unsuited to non-permissive environments and is, therefore, primarily valuable as a logistics 
platform.75 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
Maritime security plays a critical role in securing our shorelines and ports against 
DTOs. This role requires a vast number of vessels to work within the boundaries of coastal 
waters. The Navy needs cost-effective, safe vessels to deploy for counterdrug operations. 
This thesis tests two hypotheses as to how the Navy can best deploy its small surface 
platforms for maritime security and drug interdiction: 
• H1: Utilize both the LCS and EPF for counterdrug operations.  
• H2: Utilize an LCS as the lead ship for counterdrug operations while 
utilizing an EPF as a detection and monitoring (D&M) platform. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
The thesis analyzes the hypotheses by comparing the advantages and disadvantages 
of the LCS and EPF in a counterdrug maritime interdiction role. The thesis reviews U.S. 
strategy and policy publications as well as SASC reports, research reports, and newspaper 
and journal articles to establish four fundamental capabilities needed for counterdrug 
operations. The thesis reviews the ships’ real-world specifications and applications to 
determine their suitability in the counterdrug mission, a critical component of our national 
security as well as that of our partner nations. 
 
74 Jean, 35. 
75 Jean, 35. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following this first introductory chapter, the thesis accomplishes its mission in four 
subsequent chapters. Chapter II first reviews policy and strategy as regards to the vital 
importance of a maritime force and the security threats posed by DTOs. The chapter uses 
this research to develop four capabilities necessary to a successful counterdrug platform: 
the ability to support Coast Guard LEDET/Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron 
(HITRON) personnel, speed, the ability to employ air assets, and the ability to employ rigid 
hull inflatable boats (RHIB). Chapter III then weighs the capabilities of the LCS class 
against that criteria while Chapter IV does the same for the EPF class, each starting with 
the ship’s respective history. Finally, Chapter V provides the overall analytical findings, as 
well as recommendations for policymakers’ consideration and for further research.  
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II. MARITIME DRUG INTERDICTION: THREATS, POLICY, 
AND CAPABILITIES 
This chapter examines the drug trafficking threat itself and U.S. policy and strategy 
regarding maritime drug interdictions against open ocean drug trafficking to develop a set 
of capabilities needed in a drug interdiction ship, with which to later analyze the 
counterdrug capabilities of the LCS and EPF ship classes. As a means of understanding the 
threat and thereby the capabilities necessary to counter it, as well as our counterdrug goals, 
the chapter first examines the vessels that drug trafficking organizations (DTO) use, and 
then reviews policy and strategy; with this understanding, the last section summarizes the 
capabilities necessary to meet our mission.  
A. DRUG TRAFFICKING THREATS AT SEA 
DTOs utilize various transportation modes to smuggle narcotics across the 
maritime border including fishing vessels and go-fast boats that have multiple outboard 
engines and more innovative means like semi-submersibles.76 A 2020 Department of 
Homeland Security operations report also lists commercial vessels such as container 
ships.77 The following sections examine the main maritime drug trafficking vessels. 
1. Fishing Vessels 
Most illegal narcotics from Central and South America arrive in Mexico in single 
shipments via fishing trawlers. Fishing vessels, commonly known as fishing boats or 
fishing trawlers, offer advantages for drug smuggling including navigation and 
communication technology.78 Additionally, these vessels project the image of a routinely 
 
76 Department of Homeland Security, Counter Drug Operations (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2020), 2, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/uscg_-_counter-
drug_operations.pdf. 
77 Department of Homeland Security, 2. 
78 Chalk, Latin American Drug Trade, 33. 
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operating fishing boat. They may carry both legitimate cargo and drug shipments, the latter 
within the vessel’s hull or in false compartments.79  
While fishing vessels are still frequently used for drug deliveries, successful 
interdiction methods have caused DTOs to shift away from transporting large narcotic 
shipments through direct routes. Vessels carrying large amounts of illegal drugs need speed 
to get away if detected by law enforcement or the military, and fishing vessels are often 
limited in speed. On average, depending on the make/model, most fishing vessels can only 
reach speeds of 7 to 10 knots. Of course, if DTOs think they are about to be caught, 
smugglers may toss illegal cargo over the side in an attempt to look like a legal fisher 
conducting routine business, which may evade capture but decreases profits.  
2. Go-fast Boats 
The go-fast boat presents a quicker way for transporting drugs across the open 
ocean, especially for single loads.80 Crafted from wood and protected by fiberglass, these 
vessels are relatively cheap to make, ride low in the water, and have up to four outboard 
motors giving them speeds reaching 35 knots (40 miles per hour).81 Figure 2 is an image 
of a beached go-fast boat outfitted with four outboard motors. 
 
79 Chalk, 33. 
80 Dave Minsky, “Drug Smugglers Love This Janky Boat,” VICE, June 29, 2017, 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/43dypd/drug-smugglers-love-this-janky-boat. 
81 Minsky.  
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Figure 2. Go-fast Boat82 
To keep up with go-fast boats, interdiction operations often require the assistance of an 
aviation asset. 
Go-fast boats account for more than half of all drugs flowing through the maritime 
realm originating from Colombia and will likely continue to be a favored method of 
exporting cocaine.83 However, Miguel Montoya, a former drug trafficker for the Medellin 
Cartel, says, “Go-fast boats become problematic. Roughly 50 percent would sink in transit 
to their destination; it was like flipping a coin. So, the Colombian organizations figured 
there had to be a safer way to transport drugs. That’s how the idea of the semi-submersible 
was born.”84 Apparently, if drug cartels could not trick maritime enforcement authorities 
with fishing vessels or outrun them with speed, the next option was to go under them. 
3. Semi-submersibles 
In the last two decades, some DTOs in South America have invested in semi-
submersible technologies to gain both a strategic and a technological advantage in the 
ocean. Semi-submersibles transit just below the waterline, outfitted with an exhaust, air 
 
82 Source: Nathan Jones, “Pangas, Trickery, Intimidation, and Drug Trafficking in California,” Small 
Wars Journal, December 15, 2016, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pangas-trickery-intimidation-and-
drug-trafficking-in-california. 
83 Chalk, Latin American Drug Trade, 35. 
84 “Colombian Narcosubs,” October 26, 2011, VICE, video, 27:41, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2Rp-C1ph_g8. 
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stack, and a pilothouse above the water line for navigation.85 Additionally, the manning of 
these vessels requires not only a skilled captain, but also an experienced navigator to guide 
the vessel, an engineer to fix any engine problems, and a security guard to monitor the 
cargo.86 
Most DTOs secretly build their semi-submersibles among the mangroves and 
jungles of Columbia’s Pacific coast. According to Byron Ramirez, “the number of semi-
submersibles has risen, as there are reports of seized semi-submersibles in Venezuela, 
Guyana, Ecuador, and Brazil.”87 Semi-submersible submarine production has risen for two 
main reasons.88 First, coca plant cultivation throughout Colombia is at an all-time high. 
Second, drug smugglers recognize the open ocean as one of the most potent means of 
exporting narcotics across maritime borders and thus continue to expand their ranges and 
their means of smuggling their products to far-ranging markets.89  
It is a challenge to determine how many drug boats are in use on particular routes. 
The DEA estimates semi-submersibles as accounting for approximately 25 percent of the 
maritime drug flow.90 These new technologies increase the difficulty of estimating the 
number of these boats that operate undetected and arrive at their destination.91 Also, for 
DTOs, seized boats are simply a cost of doing business. While it might cost $1 to $2 million 
USD to produce a semi-submersible, and the crew will likely scuttle the vessel at its 
 
85 Tess Owen, “US Agents Watch as ‘Narco Sub’ Carrying $194 Million Worth of Cocaine Sinks 
After Bust,” VICE, March 26, 2016, https://www.vice.com/en/article/43m7kd/us-agents-watch-as-narco-
sub-carrying-194-million-worth-of-cocaine-sinks-after-bust. 
86 Owen. 
87 Byron Ramirez, “The Criminal and Terrorist Threat of Narco Submarine Technology,” Geopolitical 
Monitor, June 7, 2016, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-criminal-and-terrorist-threat-of-narco-
submarine-technology/. 
88 Stephen Thorne, “Capture of 22-Metre Transatlantic Narco-Sub Marks New Era in War on Drugs,” 
Legion Magazine, December 11, 2019, https://legionmagazine.com/en/2019/12/capture-of-22-metre-
transatlantic-narco-sub-marks-new-era-in-war-on-drugs/. 
89 Thorne. 
90 Ramirez and Bunker, “Narco-Submarines,” 7. 
91 Ramirez, “The Criminal and Terrorist Threat of Narco Submarine Technology.”  
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destination, a semi-submersible submarine may carry around $40 million worth of cocaine 
in a single successful sprint.92 
Detecting semi-submersibles from the water is problematic, but they are easily 
spotted from the air. As it can detect a military submarine traveling at periscope depth, an 
aircraft positioned in the right area can locate the semi-submersible’s periscope wake, 
which is not visible from a maritime enforcement vessel.93 However, semi-submersibles 
are outfitted with a valve that will quickly scuttle the submarine in case of detection. Then, 
the smugglers often jump overboard as the submarine sinks, prompting the interdiction 
team to conduct a search and rescue operation94 to save lives as the submarinealong with 
its incriminating shipmentsinks. With no evidence to charge the smugglers, maritime 
law enforcement end up releasing the crew to their country of origin. To address this 
problem, the U.S. government passed the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, 
making it a criminal offense to have an unregistered semi-submersible in international 
waters, regardless of the nature of its cargo.95 
DTOs persist in using semi-submersibles, and they also use complexity and 
creativity to move their product such as using “narco torpedoes.” Captain George Rincon 
of the Colombian Navy explains that, to create a narco torpedo, a torpedo-shaped container 
is hollowed out and filled with tons of cocaine and then attached and towed behind a surface 
vessel.96 As the host vessel increases speed, the torpedo submerges and remain submerged 
as long as the towing vessel continues moving.97 It is impossible to see these torpedoes 
from the sky, which results in a high success rate. Figure 3 shows a narco torpedo.  
 
92 Ramirez and Bunker, “Narco-Submarines," 17. 
93 Jason Furlong, “Hunting Submarines From The Air,” Physics World, June 13, 2018, 
https://physicsworld.com/a/hunting-submarines-from-the-air/. 
94 Chalk, Latin American Drug Trade, 37. 
95 Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, 46 and 18 U.S.C § 3598 (2008). 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/pdf/s3598-enrolled-bill.pdf 
96 Mimi Yagoub, “Why Colombia Traffickers Love High-Tech ‘Narco Torpedoes," InSight Crime, 25 
2016, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/why-colombia-cocaine-traffickers-love-high-tech-
torpedoes/. 




Figure 3. Narco Torpedo98 
Execution of the torpedo method is more complex than using a semi-submersible. The 
narco torpedo actually requires three fast boats working together: one boat to tow the 
device, a second boat to act as a decoy for any law enforcement vessels, and a third boat to 
serve as a recovery platform.99 The torpedo moves approximately 30 meters below the 
waterline, so neither an aircraft nor a boat are likely to detect it.100  
The narco torpedo does have a design flaw. Once the towing vessel stops moving, 
the torpedo shell surfaces thus becoming visible to either boat or aircraft.101 Not dissuaded, 
DTOs have modified the shell so that it remains submerged through a sophisticated 
ballasting system. Also, in the event of a possible interdiction, towing vessels can release 
the torpedo leaving it below the water. The profits are not necessarily lost in this case: 
while the torpedo remains submerged, DTOs detach the torpedo from the boat but not 
before activating a makeshift beacon system resembling a log of wood from the torpedo’s 
top, which then ascends to the surface, acting as a buoy and as a beacon recognizable only 
to DTOs. Once the scene is clear, a DTO drug recovery boat can then ensure profits are not 
lost. Figure 4 depicts the relay method process. 
 
98 Source: H. I. Sutton, “Narco Submarines, Torpedoes and Semi-Submersibles,” Covert Shores Naval 
Warfare, June 24, 2010, http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-
semi.html. 
99 Motherboard Staff, “Drug Smuggling With Submarines.”  
100 Ramirez and Bunker, “Narco-Submarines," 36. 
101 Motherboard Staff, “Drug Smuggling With Submarines.” 
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Figure 4. Narco-torpedo Relay Method102 
DTOs continuously evolve semi-submersibles and narco torpedo engineering, 
architecture, and technologies to evade detection.103 However, the interdiction of semi-
submersibles over the last few years shows that they can be defeated provided we have the 
right assets. Military and law enforcement agencies have increased collaborative efforts to 
minimize the drug movements over water; because we have caught semi-submersibles, we 
better understand their design. According to Ramirez and Bunker, “these appropriations, 
in turn, have led to our understanding of how narco-submersibles are designed, engineered, 
and used to deploy narcotics.”104 With law enforcement improving their success in 
interdicting semi-submersibles, DTOs have now turned to transit across the ocean below 
the waterline in fully submersible vessels: they are using submarines.  
 
102 Source: Mimi Yagoub, “Why Colombia Traffickers Love High-Tech ‘Narco Torpedoes.” 
103 Ramirez and Bunker, “Narco-Submarines,” 9. 
104 Ramirez and Bunker, 17.  
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4. The Fully Submersible Submarine 
In 2010, Ecuadorian authorities located the first diesel-electric fully submersible 
submarine in a tributary near the Ecuador-Colombia border.105 DTOs using submersible 
technology to traffic drugs appears to be evolving faster than anticipated, producing the 
ideal transport vessel. According to Jay Bergman, the Andean regional director for the 
DEA from 2006 to 2015, “It is the first fully functional, completely submersible submarine 
for transoceanic voyages that we have ever found...until now, all the smuggling vessels 
seized on the high seas or at clandestine shipyards built to haul multi-ton loads of cocaine 
under the Pacific’s surface were semi-submersibles.”106 The discovery of the Ecuadorian 
submarine shows that DTOs’ creativity in search of illegal profits continues.  
Similar but previous to the Ecuadorian submarine discovery, in 2017, the 
Colombian authorities located a fully electric submersible submarine in the Choco area of 
Colombia near the Panama border.107 This 30 foot long, 15 foot wide submarine had more 
than a hundred batteries for power, an electrical jet propulsion engine, and an underwater 
camera to assist in navigating below the water; it was capable of transporting narcotics into 
Central America.108 Authorities claim this vessel required approximately five months of 
construction at the cost of $1.5 million.109  
In 2020, the Colombian Navy discovered another drug submarine in Colombia’s 
Choco region, in a Cucurrupi River boatyard.110 The submarine cost an estimated $1.5 
million to build and confiscated building plans indicated it would have transported over six 
 
105 Associated Press, “Drugs Sub Captured in South American Jungle,” NBC News, July 4, 2010, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna38083616. 
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metric tons of cocaine, estimated at $120 million.111 According to submarine expert H.I. 
Sutton, “Most narco submarines interdicted by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard carry 
around 1.6 metric tons of cocaine, worth approximately $30 to 35 million. The trend had 
been towards smaller payloads per trip, but the discovery of the new submarine points 
toward a trend reversal.”112 
Colombian authorities assess that, through the use of multiple batteries, this 
submarine was capable of transiting for 12 hours, which would equate to approximately 50 
nautical miles at a speed of 4 knots.113 This submarine’s endurance and speed alone would 
make it impossible to reach its final destination without the assistance of another boat. 
According to Sutton, a towing ring on the submarine’s nose, similar to the narco torpedo, 
would allow for towing “by a larger vessel until close to its destination. It would then make 
the final leg on its own. Once unloaded, it would be scuttled and join the hundreds of 
discarded narco subs which litter the seafloor.”114  
The two submarines’ designs resembled each other and were found in the same 
area. According to Sutton, “Although this vessel’s design appears to have been active for 
at least three years, none have been interdicted at sea. This latest discovery by the 
Colombian Navy is a reminder that these sophisticated drug transports are still being built, 
inferring that spending more than $1 million is worth the effort for the traffickers.”115 









Figure 5. Fully submersible Electric Submarine116 
While interdicting a go-fast boat presented a challenge, it was not as daunting a one 
as trying to locate a fully submersible vessel. To date, no reports have emerged of any 
interdictions of a fully submersible submarine in the open ocean. For DTOs, submarine 
technology may become the drastic step they need to defeat maritime law enforcement in 
this five-decade long “cat and mouse” game, meaning many more thousands of lives lost.  
B. POLICY AND STRATEGY 
Since the 1970s, the United States has been at war over drugs. The ongoing danger 
resulting from drug use, drug trafficking, and the organized crime that supports it has 
continuously endangered American lives and jeopardized U.S. economic security. To 
combat the threat, the U.S. government and law enforcement agencies have prioritized 
maritime security and drug interdiction as evidenced by our policies and strategic priorities. 
The 2014 United States Coat Guard: Western Hemisphere Strategy, the 2019 Counterdrug 
Operations Joint Publication, and the 2015 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower offer an understanding of U.S. efforts to deter drug trafficking. The following 
sections outline U.S. counterdrug policy and strategy as relates to the capabilities we need 
to meet mission.  
 
116 Source: Sutton. 
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1. United States Coast Guard: Western Hemisphere Strategy, 2014 
The Coast Guard is the lead U.S. organization with authority to enforce maritime 
law on the high seas, including drug interdiction,117 and its Western Hemisphere Strategy 
addresses various transnational threats likely to jeopardize both overall U.S. security and 
the oceans for the next decade.118 In a layered approach to fighting DTOs, the Coast Guard 
employs a strategy of cutters, fast boats, and aircraft to interdict vessels carrying drugs that 
originate from South America, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, bound for 
Europe and the United States.119 The Western Hemisphere Strategy considers the threats 
beyond land borders on the open ocean where smugglers are vulnerable to interdiction 
efforts.120 
The Western Hemisphere Strategy lists specific capabilities from a USCG 
perspective, such as the National Security Cutter and LEDETs, necessary to succeed in 
maritime counterdrug operations. The USCG highlights, “the National Security Cutter’s 
speed, endurance, sensors, aviation, and small boat interdiction capabilities are keys to 
success in the transit zones off the coast of South America and in the Pacific to focus on 
the departure and chokepoints which offer the best probability of detection and seizure.”121 
Vice Admiral Daniel Abel, then Deputy Commandant for Coast Guard Operations, 
reaffirmed these capabilities in his 2019 testimony before the House Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation subcommittee: “The most capable interdiction platforms include 
flight deck-equipped [ships], embarked armed helicopters, deployable pursuit-capable boats, 
and Coast Guard law enforcement detachments embarked on U.S. Navy and allied ships.”122 
 
117 Department of Homeland Security, Counter Drug Operations, 2. 
118 Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard: Western Hemisphere Strategy 
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Commandant for Coast Guard Operations). 
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In his 2011 Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis, Lance Watkins highlights the 
importance of the Coast Guard’s law enforcement authority: 
The U.S. Coast Guard continues to provide legal and logistical assets for 
reducing the threat of self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) shipping 
cocaine. It allows U.S. Coast Guards members to board U.S. Naval vessels 
and act as legal liaisons known as LEDETs onboard U.S. and allied naval 
ships acting as a force multiplier in the transit zone. The USCG is able to 
operate and carry out duties and procedures as law enforcement officers. In 
addition, the U.S. Coast Guard conducts searches on board fishing vessels 
as well as looking for contraband and evidence of SPSS association. It is 
routine for fishing vessels to operate as a replenishment station for fuel and 
supplies.123 
In addition to LEDETs, incorporating a HITRON team increases the Coast Guard’s 
chance of a successful interdiction mission. James Loy, then Coast Guard Commandant, 
noticed that “80 percent of all drugs entering the United States were arriving by sea, with 
drug DTOs using go-fast boats capable of traveling over twice the speed of Coast Guard 
cutters.”124 Created in 1998 to defeat the go-fast threat, HITRON initially started with six 
Coast Guard pilots and four airmen who developed tactics involving helicopters employed 
from a surface ship and skilled marksmen.125 Public Affairs Officer Ace Castle for the 
USCG Atlantic Area explains this concept: “While aboard Navy helicopters, Coast Guard 
personnel qualified on the weapons systems, mission, and airborne use of force (AUF) 
tactics, employ warning or disabling shots. Coast Guard precision sharpshooters engage in 
warning shots and disabling fire when a vessel fails to heave to when ordered to do so.”126 
Once HITRON personnel have disabled the vessel, maritime assets in the area can board and 
arrest any drug smugglers. 
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Both research and the Western Hemisphere Strategy highlight the importance of 
multiple capabilities to conduct successful drug interdiction operations, including law 
enforcement authority, pursuit-capable vessels like cutters and fast-boats, aircraft and boats 
that can employ them, and HITRON support.  
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff: Counterdrug Operations, 2019 
Counterdrug operations mainly concentrate on preventing drug trafficking by: 
discovering maritime routes; tracking, monitoring, and boarding vessels; the capture of 
contraband and vessels; and the apprehension of smugglers.127 Title 10 USC Section 279 
prohibits the Department of Defense (DOD) from operating directly in maritime boardings; 
instead, maritime LEDETs embark on Navy and partner nation vessels.128 Generally, the 
Coast Guard leads embarkation because they have the legal authority to act as law 
enforcement, and military forces assist. A 2019 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication (JCS 
publication) provides guidelines and instructions for preparing, conducting, and assessing 
U.S. military assistance for counterdrug operations.129 The JCS publication notes that 
Navy ships also contribute to the drug interdiction mission by providing D&M functions 
as they are often nearby to intercept any suspected trafficking vessel.130  
The JCS publication describes the LEDET as a ten-person team assigned 
temporarily to Navy or partner nation military vessels when transiting in an area used for 
drug trafficking. While assigned to a Navy or partner nation ship, LEDETs are governed 
by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the USCG and the respective fleet 
commander or allied governments.131 This publication also defines the roles, 
responsibilities, and command and control structure during interdiction operations 
involving air assets. Through a signed MOU, the USN and USCG define the roles, 
 
127 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterdrug Operations, JP3-07.4 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
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responsibilities, and relationships regarding the employment of AUF from Navy 
helicopters. The MOU’s purpose is training Navy helicopter assets on approved roles, 
requirements, strategies, techniques, and procedures to support counterdrug missions. 
Similar to the Western Hemisphere Strategy, the JCS publication notes that, “To stop non-
compliant vessels with minimal risk of injury or loss of life, USN helicopters are permitted 
to use AUF (warning shots and disabling fire). The use of warning shots and disabling fire 
is governed by current USCG policy.”132 
3. U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 2015 Revision 
Stressing the importance of cooperation among different agencies and nations, A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 2015 Revision (cooperative strategy) 
describes the growing strategic capabilities of the United States’ enemies and focuses on 
the basic approach and philosophy that maritime forces should adopt.133 An example of 
such collaboration in counterdrug operations is with the JIATF-S. According to DHS, 
“JIATF-S executes the Department of Defense statutory responsibility for detecting and 
monitoring illicit drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains bound for the United 
States.”134 In 2019, JIATF-S reported that international partners and allied nations 
contributed to over 50 percent of interdictions in the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone 
through joint operations using the interdiction continuum.135 Figure 6 depicts the 
interdiction continuum. 
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Figure 6. Interdiction Continuum136 
The use of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and surface assets, in coordination with 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), DOD, and allies, combined with JIATF-S 
cueing capabilities,137 creates a defensive posture and deters drug trafficking threats 
transiting in the open ocean. According to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation,  
The interdiction continuum depicts how joint interdiction operations have 
been used to reduce the supply of cocaine to the United States. A typical 
operation begins with the collection of actionable intelligence on drug 
trafficking activities. This is used to help cue or tip the operational unit to 
narrow its patrol area and decrease response time. Next, CBP, Coast Guard, 
DOD, or allied nation Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are launched to 
detect drug smuggling activities, sort through potential targets, and monitor 
the suspect vessel(s). The MPA will then contact a nearby Coast Guard, 
Navy, or allied nation’s surface asset (e.g., a cutter, frigate, etc.) and hand-
off the vessel. The surface asset will launch a small boat or an armed Coast 
Guard helicopter manned with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment 
(LEDET) personnel to disable the vessel. The vessel is then interdicted, the 
drugs are seized, and the crew is apprehended. Final disposition of the 
vessel, drugs, and crew is coordinated between the U.S. State and Justice 
Departments and the flag state of the vessel who handles the prosecution.138 
Abel highlighted that interdiction information and intelligence, gathered through 
the various maritime assets and allies, allows for successful interdictions in the open 
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ocean.139 Abel further stated that “Assets coupled with both intelligence targeting and 
dedicated MPA support had nearly double the interdiction rate as opposed to those 
patrolling ships that had only one or neither of these supporting elements.”140 
The cooperative strategy also shows that increasing SOUTHCOM’s deterrent 
capabilities could help resolve the increasing maritime challenge in the Western 
Hemisphere.141 As Admiral Craig Faller argues, “Grey hulls, in particular, still serve as a 
powerful deterrent, sending a clear message to our competitors, and a reassuring one to our 
allies.”142 Maintaining a constant presence and providing support in the region is critical 
in discouraging drug traffickers. Throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR, JIATF-S serves as 
the lead agency in coordinating daily maritime patrols thus serving a critical role in 
deterrence.  
C. CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR A COUNTERDRUG PLATFORM 
To efficiently, and cost-effectively, counter the threatwhich continues to prove 
itself innovative, adaptable, and capable of using technology and funds to evolvewe need 
a dynamic and flexible platform as a fundamental part of our own adaptable assets. Based on 
what we know of DTOs’ vessels as well as our policy and strategy, the Navy’s counterdrug 
platform must have the following capabilities. 
First, the Navy’s counterdrug platform must support Coast Guard LEDET/ HITRON 
teams. To board drug boats and arrest drug traffickers, the Coast Guard must exercise its 
legal maritime authority. LEDETs usually deploy with HITRON personnel, and Navy ships 
must be able to carry and transfer those personnel as part of the interdiction process. 
Additionally, LEDET/HITRON teams have experienced marksmen that can disable a 
vessel’s engine if the smugglers refuse to stop. LEDETs are trained to conduct contested 
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maritime boardings in counterdrug operations while also enforcing maritime law. LEDETs 
rely heavily on naval vessels to fulfill their mission. In a Naval War College paper, Andrew 
Edwards argues, “Although LEDETs are dependent on Navy vessels, that dependence is due 
more to the seamanship capabilities than the warfighting capabilities of the 
platform…typically, a Navy ship’s only job is to support its embarked LEDET and air 
detachments by being a mobile, floating fortress from which to operate.”143 In addition, 
utilizing the embarked MH-60R, HITRON marksmen can immobilize any non-compliant 
watercraft with pinpoint accuracy, damaging a craft’s engine from the sky.144  
Second, the Navy’s counterdrug platform must prioritize speed. A vessel needs to be 
able to keep up with the go-fast threat and to be able to reach a drug-trafficking vessel’s 
location expeditiously. If a vessel cannot keep up or arrive in time, it does not matter what 
personnel are present; thus, LEDET/HITRON supportability and speed capabilities are 
almost equally important. However, in addition to the fundamental need for legal authority, 
if a Navy platform fails to reach the threat in time, it can potentially make up for a speed 
deficiency if it can employ an aviation asset to locate and maintain contact with the threat.  
Third, the Navy’s counterdrug platform must be able to employ aviation assets. In 
addition to aircraft increasing the likelihood of spotting or tracking potential DTO vessels, 
including semi-submersibles, aviation capability allows for HITRON members to disable a 
non-compliant vessel from the air. Also, aviation capability provides boarding teams with 
updated information and overwatch on the situation when approaching the threat.  
Fourth, the Navy’s counterdrug platform must be able to employ RHIB. RHIB 
employment is crucial as small boats are primarily utilized to interdict and board a suspected 
drug boat while keeping the main interdiction platform at a safe distance. RHIBs are also 
utilized to transport LEDET and Visit, Board, and Seizure Teams (VBSS) to the threat. 
The next two chapters weigh the LCS and EPF options against these four necessary 
capabilities to determine their suitability for the drug interdiction mission. 
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III. THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 
This chapter examines the LCS’s capabilities in conducting counterdrug operations, 
especially given the Navy’s need for a speedy platform that can support LEDET/ HITRON 
teams and employ air assets and RHIB. The chapter first describes the LCS platforms then 
examines the capabilities and limitations of the Independence- and Freedom-variants 
before then weighing LCS capabilities against the Navy’s four primary requirements.  
A. THE BIRTH OF THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 
As the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the threat of the Soviet Union’s maritime 
fleet also grew quiet. As a result, the Navy did not need to show as much power at sea and 
shifted its focus to projecting sea power in littoral regions.145  
A 1992 Department of the Navy whitepaper launched the Naval Doctrine 
Command, charged with developing a strategy for the future of littoral warfare.146 In 2001, 
the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant program, geared towards developing 
three new ship classes, one of which was “a smaller combatant called the LCS to counter 
electric and diesel submarines, small surface attack craft, and mines in heavily contested 
littoral (near-shore) areas.”147 Former CNO Admiral Vernon Clark documented the 
deficiencies of the Navy’s littoral capabilities across the fleet, such as “lack of enhanced 
mine warfare capability, lack of shallow-water anti-submarine Warfare capability, and lack 
of an effective counter to small craft.”148 In FY2005, the Navy began acquiring the first 
LCS platforms, with 35 more LCS platforms acquired in FY2018 and three in FY2019.149 
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The original LCS was meant to offer a small, inexpensive yet maneuverable, 
shallow draft platform, capable of reaching fast speeds, designed to fill operational 
missions in the littoral region identified by former CNO Admiral Clark.150 According to 
the Navy,  
The LCS’s primary missions are anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine 
countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare (SUW) against small boats 
(including so-called “swarm boats”), particularly in littoral (i.e., near-shore) 
waters. The LCS program includes the development and procurement of 
ASW, MCM, and SUW modular mission packages. Additional potential 
missions for LCSs include peacetime engagement and partnership-building 
operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; 
maritime security and intercept operations (including anti-piracy 
operations); support of Marines or special operations forces; and homeland 
defense operations.151 
The Navy decided to construct two different platforms—USS Freedom (LCS 1) 
monohull variant, launched on September 23, 2006, and USS Independence (LCS 2) 
trimaran variant, launched on April 30, 2008.152 With two different variants competing for 
the final design and further production, the Navy ultimately asked Congress for approval 
to order ten platforms of each variant.153  
1. LCS Class, Independence-variant  
The first LCS, Independence-variant, designed by General Dynamics and later 
constructed by Austal USA, departed from traditional shipbuilding of Navy vessels. Figure 
7 shows the USS Independence (LCS 2), the lead ship of the class, with a trimaran hull, 
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which resembles a similar design from Austal Australia known as the Benchijigua Express 
ferry.154  
 
Figure 7. Independence-variant155 
According to Austal, the LCS trimaran design provides a vessel with less water friction 
while transiting the open ocean, allowing for greater speeds.156 Additionally, the LCS 
trimaran design widens the ship, giving it the largest flight deck amongst the Navy’s SCS. 
One drawback of the hull, however, is that its design and superstructure are composed of 
aluminum rather than steel, which lightens the ship and reduces the hull’s strength.157 
The Independence-variant has an overall length of 419 feet, a beam of 103.7 feet at 
its largest breadth, and a shallow draft of 15.1 feet.158 Its propulsion system utilizes a 
combination of diesel and gas (CODAG), composed of two LM2500 gas turbine engines 
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and two MTU 20V 8000 diesel engines.159 Combined, running at full power, all four 
engines give the Independence a speed in excess of 40 knots.160 With the CODAG 
propulsion system, the Independence uses four Wartsila waterjets instead of rudders to 
maneuver quickly at high speeds.161 Table 1 lists further characteristics and armament for 
an Independence-variant. 
Table 1. Independence-variant Characteristics162 
Specifications Independence-Variant 
Builder General Dynamics 
Length 419 feet 
Beam 103.7 feet 
Draft 15.1 feet 
Range 3,500 nm at 14 knots/ 1,000 nm at full sprint speed 
Top Speed >40 knots 
Hangar Space 2 x MH60S or 1 x MH60S and 2 x MQ-8 
Watercraft Launch and 
Recover 
Up to Sea State 4 
Aircraft Launch and Recover Up to Sea State 5 
Power 2 x GE LM2500 gas turbines 
2x MTU 8000 series diesel engines 
Waterjets 4 x Wartsila steerable waterjets 
Personnel 96; 60 core + 23 aviation detachment + 15 mission 
package 
Weapons MK 110 57mm gun 
SeaRAM: 11 RIM-116 missiles 
4 x .50 cal machine guns 
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2. LCS Class, Freedom-variant 
Compared to the Independence, the Freedom, built by Lockheed Martin, represents 
a more traditional design. Instead of a trimaran hull, the Freedom uses a reinforced steel 
monohull for durability and a superstructure made of aluminum to reduce overall 
weight.163 Figure 8 shows the Freedom-variant.  
 
Figure 8. Freedom-variant USS Fort Worth (LCS 3)164 
The Freedom has an overall length of 387.6 feet, a beam of 57.7 feet, and a draft of 
14.1 feet.165 Similar to the Independence, the Freedom uses a CODAG system equipped 
with two Rolls Royce MT-30 gas turbine engines and two Fairbanks Morse Colt-Pielstick 
diesel engines.166 It is powered by water jets, two of which are steerable and two of which 
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are static for fixed lift, which allows the ship to achieve speeds over 40 knots.167 Table 2 
lists further characteristics and armament for the Freedom-variant. 
Table 2. Freedom-variant Characteristics168 
Specifications Freedom-Variant 
Builder Lockheed Martin 
Length 387 feet 
Beam 57.4 feet 
Draft 14.1 feet 
Range 3,500 nm at 14 knots, approximately 1,000 nm at full 





Hangar Space 2xMH60S or 1xMH60S and 1xMQ-8 
Watercraft Launch and 
Recover 
Up to Sea State 4 
Aircraft Launch and Recover Up to Sea State 5 
Power 2 x Rolls Royce MT30 gas turbine 
2x Colt-Pielstick diesel engines 
Waterjets 2 x moveable Rolls Royce Kameawa outboard 
waterjets 
2 x fixed boost waterjets 
Personnel 96; 60 core + 23 aviation detachment + 15 mission 
package 
 
a. Engineering concerns  
In 2021, the Navy concluded that a mechanical design flaw involving the 
combining gear in the Freedom had resulted in engineering mishaps aboard multiple ships 
requiring a full investigation into the matter.169 This matter dates from 2020, when the 
 
167 Fincantieri, “Littoral Combat Ship - Freedom Class Frigates,” accessed March 29, 2021, 
https://www.fincantieri.com/en/products-and-services/naval-vessels/lcs/. 
168 Adapted from U.S. Navy, “Littoral Combat Ship Class - LCS.”  
169 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Calls Freedom LCS Propulsion Problem Class-Wide Defect, Won’t Take 
New Ships Until Fixed,” USNI News, January 19, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/01/19/navy-calls-
freedom-lcs-propulsion-problem-class-wide-defect-wont-take-new-ships-until-fixed. 
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USS Detroit (LCS 7) and USS Little Rock (LCS 9) experienced propulsion failures while 
operating at sea. According to Lockheed Martin officials,  
With just the diesel engines engaged, the ship can make between 10 and 12 
knots, but to go any faster, it must engage the gas turbine engines. The 
combining gear connects power from two large gas turbine engines and two 
main propulsion diesel engines to the ship’s propulsion shafts, which propel 
the ship through the water with water jets. It is a system with a lot of moving 
parts and has proven unreliable. Repeated failures in the propulsion train on 
the Freedom-class littoral combat ships Little Rock and Detroit have raised 
the specter of a class-wide design flaw that could trigger an expensive 
reworking of a crucial component on 17 of the Navy’s small surface 
combatants.170 
The Freedom LCSs currently in the fleet operate under a strict advisory that requires 
them to work with constraints to preclude the combining gear fault from occurring, unlike 
the Independence ships with their different propulsion train.171 
B. MISSION MODULES 
The LCS was initially designed as a modular platform to address a plethora of 
asymmetric threats in the operational environment.172 The LCS intended to utilize a “plug-
and-fight” concept to allow rapid equipment changes in-port: in approximately 1 to 4 days, 
the ships were supposed to be able to proceed with a different mission package, such as 
SUW, ASW, or MIW.173 This thesis focuses only on the SUW and ASW mission packages 
for the drug interdiction mission. 
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1. Surface Warfare 
According to the Navy, “The SUW [mission package] installed on an LCS provides 
fleet protection from small boats and other asymmetrical threats.”174 This mission package 
allows for operational security in various interdiction missions such as against smugglers, 
terrorist suspects, and pirates and protects against coastal threats in the littorals. Also, 
according to the Navy, “This mission package augments the core LCS sensor and weapons 
capabilities, providing a layered defense capability for rapidly detecting, tracking and 
prosecuting small boat threats. Ultimately, this mission package enhances the safety of the 
Sailors while permitting the mission commander to maintain operational flexibility.”175 
The SUW module is composed of the following: a MK 46 Gun Weapon System, a Surface-
to-Surface mission module carrying the Longbow missile, an MH-60R helicopter capable 
of employing Hellfire missiles, M240 and .50 caliber machine guns, an MQ-8 Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and a Security Module composed of 11-meter RHIBs and a VBSS 
team.176  
2. Anti-Submarine Warfare 
According to the Navy, “The ASW mission package provides Joint Force 
Commanders the ability to conduct detect-to-engage missions against both diesel and 
nuclear submarines.”177 According to LCS mission module program manager Captain Ted 
Zobel, the ASW module comprises a Dual-mode Array Transmitter Mission System, an 
SQQ-89 acoustic processing system, Multi-Function Towed Array, and an MH-60R 
helicopter.178 The Navy contends that the ASW mission package was developed to 
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readily provide ASW capabilities when operating in deep and shallow water environments 
and conducting ASW prosecution on any detected possible submarine, including narco-
subs.179 The ASW mission package comprises advanced equipment, which, as Captain 
Zobel states, “will provide revolutionary capabilities to the fleet.”180 
3. Mission Module Changes 
Again, the LCS mission package is composed of three individual different mission 
sets: SUW, ASW, and MCM. Each module consists of additional weapons; unmanned 
aerial, surface, and sub-surface vehicles; manned aircraft; and additional people to 
empower a vessel to complete the assigned tasking and mission.181 Unfortunately, the 
various modules and “plug-and-fight” concepts have encountered numerous obstacles.182 
According to a 2020 Government Accountability Office report, those obstacles meant that 
the packages could no longer be swapped out:  
The USN LCS packages—composed of weapons, helicopters, boats, 
sensors, and other systems deployed from an LCS—are intended to provide 
mine countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), and anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) capabilities. The USN planned to swap packages among 
LCS but has now assigned each LCS a permanent package.183 
In February 2016, the Navy created an LCS review team to examine the operational 
impact regarding the modularity concept for the LCS mission package. In September 2016, 
 
179 U.S. Navy, “Littoral Combat Ship,” All Hands Magazine, accessed March 29, 2021, 
https://allhands.navy.mil/Features/LCS/. 
180 “US Navy Receives Final Component of LCS ASW Mission Package,” Naval Today, December 6, 
2018, https://www.navaltoday.com/2018/12/06/us-navy-receives-final-component-of-lcs-asw-mission-
package/. 
181 The Oversight, Acquisition, Testing, and Employment, of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and LCS 
Mission Module Programs: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 114th Cong. 2 
(2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg28323/html/CHRG-114shrg28323.htm. 
182 Tom Lohr, “Focus Littoral Combat Ships on Antisurface Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute, February 
2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/february/focus-littoral-combat-ships-antisurface-
warfare. 
183 Gene Dodaro, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment- Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster 
Increases Importance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020), 129. 
44 
the Navy released recommendations and program changes from the review team.184 The 
LCS review team recommended discarding the modularity concept in favor of a specific 
LCS with one permanent mission package, giving the theater commander an adaptable 
modular platform to confront asymmetric threats. As a result, 24 of the planned 28 LCSs 
will merge into six divisions stationed on each coast, three Independence-variant divisions 
homeported in San Diego, California, and three Freedom-variant divisions positioned in 
Mayport, Florida. With each LCS gaining one permanent warfare mission package, the 
core crew and mission package assigned to the LCS will merge, creating a larger crew size 
from 60 to approximately 75.185  
C. NECESSARY CAPABILITIES FOR A DRUG INTERDICTION SHIP 
Having reviewed LCS history, variants, and current events, Section C weighs LCS 
capabilities against the Navy’s need for capabilities for: LEDET/HITRON supportability, 
speed, and employment of air assets and RHIBs in conducting counterdrug operations.  
1. LEDET/HITRON Supportability 
To legally interdict and arrest drug traffickers, the Navy needs its platform to 
support a USCG LEDET/HITRON team. Simultaneously, HITRON personnel lend the 
ability to safely immobilize a non-compliant vessel. Until 1981, Congress authorized the 
use of DOD services, platforms, and equipment to support federal law enforcement in drug 
interdiction. However, under the Posse Comitatus Act, DOD personnel are barred from 
engaging in law enforcement without Congressional authorization. While operating in the 
SOUTHCOM AOR, Coast Guard LEDETs are regularly deployed aboard naval vessels to 
enforce legal boardings outlined under 10 U.S.C. §379. Since 2015, the Navy has utilized 
different ship classes to support the counterdrug mission, including the LCS.186 
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To properly stop and apprehend drug smugglers, the Navy requires a Coast Guard 
LEDET. HITRON teams are also required by the Navy to immobilize a non-compliant 
drug vessel. Because the structural architecture and hangar bay enable the capacity to 
adequately store and maintain a helicopter onboard, an LCS may transport HITRON 
personnel and their accompanying aircraft. 
2. Speed 
The Navy needs speed in its counterdrug platform because a ship must be able to 
keep up with drug traffickers whose go-fast boats can reach speeds in excess of 35 
knots.187 Additionally, the vessel must be able to reach the potential DTO boat 
expeditiously. The speed of the Independence makes it especially well-suited for 
counterdrug interdiction. According to LCS Captain Dan Straub, the LCS can reach speeds 
up to 40 knots; combined with its maneuverability above the waterline, this speed has a 
significant impact at the tactical and operational level.188 Additionally, the Freedom- and 
Independence-variants can reach highs speed in a few short minutes while generating a 
backing movement rapidly in a few ship lengths. Straub notes that its ability to generate 
high sprint speeds “allows the LCS to rapidly reposition to reinforce different groups of 
civilian vessels requiring protection, enabling a greater economy of force, while tactical 
agility confers advantages in close maneuvering situations, such as dodging would-be 
rammers.”189 With the CODAG propulsion system, operators onboard can utilize either 
gas turbines, diesels, or both. Using only diesel engines at economical speeds allows the 
LCS to use less fuel than other Navy surface ships, which primarily use gas turbines; less 
fuel usage increases the time to remain on station before returning to port.190 With the go-
fast boats reaching speeds above 30 knots, the LCS speed is on par to meet this threat.  
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3. Aviation Employment 
When it comes to countering drug trafficking threats, speed means little without 
proper actionable intelligence.191 Actionable intelligence cues a maritime aviation asset to 
localize and track any suspected drug trafficking maritime threat while the surface asset 
speeds towards the threat. How does the LCS stack up in terms of aviation support ability?  
The LCS flight deck size and characteristics for both variants are larger than other 
Navy surface ships such as destroyers or cruisers.192 According to Straub, the Freedom-
variant has a flight deck size of approximately 7,300 square feetroughly one and a half 
times larger than a large surface combatant (LSC)while the Independence-variant has a 
flight deck size of approximately 11,000 square feet—the largest of any LSC in the 
fleet.193 The Freedom-variant flight deck can support up to two MQ-8B/C Fire Scout 
unmanned helicopters or one MH-60R/S Seahawk manned helicopter. Figure 9 depicts the 
MQ-8 variant assigned to LCS ships, and Table 3 shows the platform characteristics. Figure 
10 illustrates the MH-60S, and Table 4 shows the platform characteristics.  
 
Figure 9. MQ-8B and MQ-8C Fire Scout onboard USS Independence194  
 
191 H.R., Western Hemisphere Drug Interdictions, 9. 
192 Straub. 
193 Straub. 




Table 3. MQ-8B195 and MQ-8C196 Specifications 
 MQ-8B MQ-8C 
Length 31.5 feet 34.7 feet 
Weight 2,000 lbs (empty) / 3,150 
lbs (day fuel + payload) 
3,200 lbs (empty) / 6,000 lbs (day 
fuel + payload) 




135 knots  
115 knots 
Service Ceiling 12,500 feet 16,000 feet 
Endurance 5.5 hours 12 hours 
 
 
Figure 10. MH-60R Helicopter197 
 
195 Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command, “MQ-8B Fire Scout,” NAVAIR, accessed March 28, 
2021, https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/mq-8b. 
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Submarines,” News18, February 26, 2020, https://www.news18.com/news/auto/a-look-at-sikorsky-mh-60r-
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Table 4. MH-60R and MH-60S198 Specifications 
 MH-60R MH-60S 
Primary Function ASW, SUW ASUW, Combat Support, 
Humanitarian Disaster 
Relief, Search and Rescue, 
Medical Evacuation, MIW 
Countermeasures 
Length 64 feet 64 feet 
Height 17 feet 17 feet 
Weight 14,430 lbs (empty) / 23,500 lbs (max 
gross) 
14,430 lbs (empty), 23,500 
lbs (max gross) 
 
Max Airspeed 180 knots 180 knots 
Ceiling 13,000 feet 13,000 feet 
Range 245 nautical miles 245 nautical miles 
Crew Three Four 
 
The Independence-variant flight deck, on the other hand, can support more aviation 
assets simultaneously. Although it is not needed often, the Independence-variant flight 
deck can support two MH-60R/S simultaneously, either on approach for landing or 
launching. 
To combat the drug interdiction threat, both LCS variants are capable of launching 
multiple aviation assets to generate a larger maritime picture. As intelligence reports are 
sent to surface assets, aircraft can be immediately launched and vectored towards the 
location to localize and track any suspected drug trafficking vessel. The endurance on the 
MQ-8B/C and MH-60R/S allows an operator extended time in the air to refine the maritime 
picture, follow a suspected drug vessel, provide situational reports back to the home ship, 
and give overwatch cover while the main interdiction ship is en route to the drug trafficking 
threat. When an aircraft finds a suspected drug vessel and relays that information back to 
 
198 Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command, “MH-60S Seahawk,” NAVAIR, accessed March 28, 
2021, https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/MH-60S-Seahawk. 
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the interdiction ship to close the intelligence loop, the interdiction ship arrives at the 
operating area where the drug vessel is located and deploys an RHIB to board a suspect 
drug trafficking vessel. 
4. Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Employment 
Employing a RHIB is crucial, as small boats are primarily utilized to interdict and 
board a suspected drug boat while keeping the main interdiction platform at a safe distance. 
Like all Navy vessels, the LCS variants are capable of deploying multiple RHIBs. With the 
SUW mission package, an LCS is assigned two 11-meter RHIBs specifically for small boat 
interdictions. Again, the SUW mission package also provides a VBSS team for any 
boarding mission, as needed. Numerous LEDET teams may be embarked because of the 
berthing capacity on an LCS and its mission bay can store multiple RHIBs to serve multiple 
LEDET teams. Multiple RHIBs can be launched from the Independence and Freedom 
variant.  
Figure 11 shows how the Freedom-variant can deploy both a 7- and 11-meter RHIB 
utilizing the stern door located behind the ship.  
 
Figure 11. Freedom-variant RHIB Launch199 
 
199 Source: “Freedom Class LCS Littoral Combat Ship U.S. Navy,” Seaforces, accessed March 28, 
2021, https://www.seaforces.org/usnships/lcs/Freedom-class.htm. 
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This employment design allows for immediate launch and recoveries at a moment’s notice. 
One RHIB is loaded into the stern ramp utilizing a moveable boat skid, which allows for 
immediate use.  
Figure 12 shows how the Independence-variant instead utilizes a crane mechanism 
called the Twin Boom Extendable Crane to load, lower, and launch one 11-meter RHIB at 
a time.  
 
Figure 12. Independence-variant Launching an 11-meter RHIB200 
In addition, the Independence-variant also carries one 7-meter RHIB located on the port-
quarter (back left corner) of the ship. Although this potentially allows the Independence-
variant to launch three small boats, the 7-meter RHIB serves as a ready lifeboat if the two 
larger RHIBs are out of service. 
Considering the drug threat in the open ocean, having one main interdiction ship 
and multiple RHIBs, with aviation assets, allows for greater opportunity to interdict drug 
trafficking threats, whether they be numerous narco submarines trying to sneak by or three 
fast boats conducting the narco-torpedo method. The 7-meter RHIB operates at a maximum 
 
200 Source: “Independence Class LCS Littoral Combat Ship U.S. Navy,” Seaforces, accessed January 
8, 2021, http://www.seaforces.org/usnships/lcs/Independence-class.htm.  
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speed of 31 knots and carries approximately 18 people201 while the 11-meter RHIB 
achieves speeds excess of 45 knots and can carry up to 26 people.202 Although the 7-meter 
can be utilized as an interdiction/boarding vessel, it is primarily used as a ready lifeboat for 
emergency situations such as search and rescue. When an LCS is outfitted with the SUW 
mission package, the 11-meter RHIBs are the primary interdiction assets due to their 
increased speed and higher passenger capacity to transport smugglers and their illegal 
cargo.  
D. ANALYSIS 
Both LCS platforms meet the requirements to support counterdrug missions. In a 
SASC Committee report, Admiral Craig Faller stated, “Counter-narcotic operations 
demand platforms for the endgame, working with law enforcement to take both the 
detainees we gain intel from and drugs off the street.”203 However, the Freedom’s internal 
mechanical design drastically decreases the speed capability within the class.  
The Navy will be taking an operational risk if the Independence-variant operates at 
high speeds while the combining gear issue remains uncorrected. As stated, the Freedom-
variant can generate approximately only 10 to 12 knots with only the diesel engines. That 
speed reduction, necessary for safety given the uncorrected design issue, will drastically 
decrease interdiction capabilities for the common maritime drug threat—the go-fast boat. 
The Freedom-variant will still be able to pursue fishing trawlers and submersibles, but it 
will also be slow to rendezvous to an operating area in response to any maritime drug threat. 
Delayed arrival to the operating area means a potential missed opportunity to act on 
intelligence and interdict drug traffickers.  
As a result, both aviation and HITRON/LEDET employment becomes even more 
critical to compensate for the relative slow speed. With the speed degradation, the 
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Independence-variant serves as a more versatile platform to combat the various maritime 
drug trafficking threats. Overall, the LCS platforms are suitable for the drug interdiction 
mission; Table 5 summarizes their capabilities and deficiencies. 
Table 5. LCS and Interdiction Factors 
Factor Independence Freedom 
Speed + — 
Aviation + + 
RHIB + + 
LEDET/HITRON + + 
 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The LCS program objectives were to acquire and deliver an SSC platform that was 
inexpensive, stealthy, and had a versatile mission package concept to allow “plug-and-
fight” for different warfare areas. With design flaws, engineering concerns, and failure of 
mission package diversity, the LCS program failed to meet the original expectations, which 
brought into question the LCS platform’s viability to support the drug-interdiction mission. 
The LCS platforms pose an ability to combat maritime drug trafficking and provide 
Combatant Commanders, specifically SOUTHCOM, with the capabilities and 
requirements for an LCS to be an elected maritime drug interdiction platform, similar to 
the OHP Frigates. As stated, the known Freedom-variant engineering flaw makes the 
Independence-variant a more capable platform for the various drug trafficking threats. 
Nonetheless, both the Independence- and Freedom-variants are able to conduct 
counterdrug interdiction operations. 
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IV. THE EXPEDITIONARY FAST TRANSPORT SHIP—A 
CREATIVE SOLUTION 
This chapter examines the EPF’s capabilities in conducting counterdrug operations, 
especially given the Navy’s need for a speedy platform that can support LEDET/ HITRON 
teams, air assets, and RHIBs. The chapter first describes the EPF platforms then examines 
their capabilities and limitations before then weighing EPF capabilities against the Navy’s 
four necessary capabilities for a platform. 
A. THE EXPEDITIONARY FAST TRANSPORT  
The EPF vessel is a one-of-a-kind aluminum hybrid, combining high-speed 
transportation with ferryboat architecture, weighing in over 1,600 tons and with an overall 
length of 338 feet, making it the maritime equivalent of a cargo plane.204 According to 
analyst Jean Grace of the National Defense Industrial Association, the EPF’s “mission is 
logistical in nature, able to rearrange and reconfigure medium payloads of supplies and 
operational units for transport into areas that traditional deep-draft vessels may be unable 
to access.”205 Peterjohn Gangcuangco, Theodore Awa, and Kendrick Garrett, in their 
master’s thesis, note that the EPF is operated primarily by a crew of 41 civilian mariners 
versus Sailors but can embark military personnel; it has 144 berthings and seats over 300 
people.206 The vessel is also capable of “soft power” missions such as humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, joint military drills, and diplomatic engagements.207 
However, to safely operate in higher threat environments, the EPF requires an escort by a 
combatant vessel, such as a destroyer, cruiser, or an LCS.208 
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1. History 
Initial U.S. interest in high-speed catamarans dates from 1999, when the Royal 
Australian Navy deployed the 86-meter high-speed catamaran Jervis Bay to support the 
East Timor crisis and subsequent joint exercises in 2000.209 A 2006 memorandum from 
the then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Kenneth 
Krieg, detailed the specifications and authorized the initial review and assessment of the 
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The memorandum called for the procurement of a vessel 
capable of reaching high speeds, with a shallow draft and with personnel and cargo lift 
capabilities. Additionally, Krieg states in the memorandum:  
Future joint forces will be responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, 
survivable, and sustainable. The nation will need lift assets that can provide 
for assured access, decrease predictability and dwell time, and have the 
capacity to quickly deliver troops and equipment together in a manner that 
provides for unit integrity. The JHSV will provide combatant commanders 
high-speed intra-theater sealift mobility with inherent cargo handling 
capability and the agility to achieve positional advantage over operational 
distances. Not limited to major ports, the JHSV will be able to operate in 
austere environments.210 
In his 2016 master’s thesis, Brian Watson noted that the Navy’s JHSV experiment 
looked into commercial catamarans for military intra-theater lift capabilities.211 Initially, 
the experiment looked into a high-speed vessel (HSV) known as the Joint Venture (HSV 
X1), which used both Army and Navy forces to demonstrate how existing commercial 
technology could be adapted for military application.212 Under Army use, HSV Joint 
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Venture conducted logistical and military operations while operating in the Persian Gulf 
supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.213 Under Navy use, the HSV Joint Venture deployed 
as a command and control (C2) platform for a mine warfare readiness group in the Gulf of 
Mexico.214 Results from both proved a positive impact from the JHSV on military 
operations.  
After further testing, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps leased three catamaran 
vessels for technology demonstrations.215 The Army leased the Spearhead Theater Support 
Vessel (TSV) (TSV-1X) to conduct logistical operations.216 Spearhead served in a military 
support capacity during Operation Enduring Freedom and demonstrated its usefulness in 
supporting and sustaining combat operations relating to the Army’s Title 10 role for water 
transport.217 The Navy used the HSV Swift as a support platform in conducting mine 
clearance operations, and the Marine Corps used the Westpac Express as a connector, 
highlighting its transport capabilities between sea and shore.218  
The Navy and Marine Corps experiments centered on executing missions in 
implementing the Navy’s Sea Power 21 concept.219 The Navy’s HSV Swift demonstrated 
its principal roles in force protection, fleet support, and humanitarian assistance. This 
concept had three parts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. In Sea Basing, the JHSV 
allows for sea bases where the Navy and Marine Corps can, together, stage and project 
military force, a huge advantage. The MV Westpac Express (HSV 4676), a catamaran that 
transports Marines and freight throughout the Western Pacific, demonstrated the power of 
the Sea Basing concept and in moving troops between power projection platforms on land 
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and sea for the Marine Corps.220 In September 2015, then Navy Secretary Ray Maybus 
formally changed the JHSV class to the EPF so as to have a traditional three-letter name 
and also to highlight the E-class of ships as expeditionary transport vehicles.221 Initially, 
DOD planned for ten ships in the Spearhead class: five for the Army and five for the 
Navy.222  
2. Concept 
In its mature version, the EPF operates as a high-speed, shallow draught cargo 
vessel. It is a Small Water-plane Area Twin Hull with jet propulsion, built at the same 
Astral Shipyards that constructs the Independence-variant LCS.223 According to Rusty 
Murdaugh, Austal USA’s chief financial officer, “At its core, the EPF is designed to be 
highly capable, flexible, and affordable. With this baseline, we’ve been able to deliver 
multiple ships that are performing different missions for the U.S. military.”224 The EPFs 
entering the fleet serve as an auxiliary vice combat ship operated by civilian mariners under 
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) construct.225 As an MSC platform, an EPF’s self-
defense capability will be limited to .50-caliber machine guns operated by an embarked 
military security detachment to increase its self-defense capabilities.226 Figure 13 depicts 
the USNS Newport (EPF 12). 
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Figure 13. USNS Newport (EPF 12)227 
EPFs can affect their AORs in various ways.228 They can rapidly transport large 
amounts of equipment and personnel in a given AOR, enabling effective adaptation and 
response. They can also be outfitted with specially designed CONEX containers for 
counterdrug D&M. Although the ship is currently unarmed, it has enough flexibility to 
incorporate different weapons to function as both an offensive and defensive platform in a 
benign environment.229 
The EPF was designed as a high-speed ferry for missions like those carried out by 
the MV Westpac Express.230 The EPF has a flight deck for helicopter and UAS operations 
and a ramp for offloading vehicles quickly. However, when it comes to finding new ways 
to move missions forward, the EPF is rapidly proving to be a much more flexible asset than 
just a transport vessel.231 
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EPFs serve a critical role as a strategic connector and small mothership. The 
Spearhead-class EPFs can hold everything from troops to more than 600 metric tons of 
cargo, and they have a mission bay of 20,000 square feet for versatility and a mission range 
of 1,200 nautical miles.232 The EPF can efficiently transport soldiers, tanks, helicopters, 
and small boats over long distances. According to Navy Captain Henry Hendrix, 
“Tomorrow [the EPF] could integrate a number of custom-built mission packages from 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) support to long-range sensors that could take the utility 
of these relatively cheap platforms ($400 million per ship) in radically different 
directions.”233 The EPF’s large beam and capacity have substantial logistical capabilities, 
but the vessel’s catamaran nature makes it impossible to operate efficiently in turbulent 
conditions.234 Table 6 lists the specifications for the EPF. 
Table 6. EPF Specifications235 
Specifications EPF 
Builder Austal 
Length 337.9 feet 
Beam 93.5 feet 
Draft 12.5 feet 
Speed (Average/Max) 35 knots with payload / 43 knots (without payload) 
Range 1200NM Max transit/5600nm self-deployment 
Aviation 1 x helicopter landing area (up to a CH-53) 
Propulsion 4 x MTU 20V 80000 M71 Diesel Engines 
Waterjets 4 x Wartsila WLD 1400 SR 
Personnel Civilian Mariners (able to support up to 104) 
Weapons 4 x .50 caliber machine guns 
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B. ELEMENTS FOR A DRUG INTERDICTION SHIP 
This section weighs the EPF capabilities against the Navy’s requirements for 
LEDET/HITRON supportability, speed, and employment of air assets and RHIBs in 
counterdrug operations. 
1. LEDET/HITRON Supportability 
Again, the Navy requires a Coast Guard LEDET to lawfully intercept and arrest 
narcotics smugglers. The EPFs’ berthing capacity allows for multiple LEDET teams to be 
embarked,236 and its large mission bay can store multiple RHIBs to support multiple 
LEDET teams.  
Additionally, the Navy requires HITRON personnel to immobilize a non-compliant 
narcotics vessel. An EPF cannot embark HITRON personnel and their associated aircraft as 
the structural design leaves it with no hangar bay to properly store and maintain a helicopter 
onboard. Thus, to use HITRON personnel would require a rotary aircraft from an additional 
surface ship to launch, recover, and store an aircraft in its hangar, meaning an EPF would 
need to work in tandem with other surface ships while conducting counterdrug operations. 
2. Speed 
The ability to keep up with DTOs’ go-fast boats is a vital consideration for any ship 
platform involved in counterdrug operations. The speed of the Spearhead class EPF makes 
it especially well-suited for the drug interdiction mission. With the go-fast drug trafficking 
threat reaching speeds above 30 knots, the EPF’s speed capacity is on par to match this 
threat. Like the LCS, the EPF utilizes four Wartsila waterjets and four MTU diesel engines 
that produce over 12,000 hp. Without any payloads onboard, the EPF has a maximum speed 
of 43 knots, and, with cargo on board, the EPF still has a running speed of 35 knots, which 
produces a range of 1,200 nautical miles.237 With an aviation asset such as a helicopter on 
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board, the EPF can easily reach the speeds of a go-fast boat. However, the EPF has strict 
Safe Operating Envelopes that significantly limit its speed capability. Efficiently using the 
EPFs’ maximum speed capability requires a sea state not to exceed Sea State 3, where the 
waves reach a maximum height of 4 feet; once an EPF operates in Sea State 3, the ship must 
reduce speed to reduce any damage to the hull.238  
3. Aviation Employment 
As Chapter II noted, speed means nothing in countering the drug trafficking threat 
without actionable intelligence. While the surface asset races to the threat, actionable 
intelligence cues a maritime aviation asset to localize and monitor any potential drug 
trafficking threat. This section considers the EPF’s aviation capabilities. 
The current EPFs have a flight deck for landing and launching helicopters as wide 
as the CH-53, the Marine Corps’ heaviest helicopter.239 However, the EPF currently lacks 
a helicopter hangar, leaving it unable to embark a helo detachment, though discussions have 
been held to embark a detachment in future platform modifications.240 
Another new aviation concept for the EPF is using unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
to support the drug interdiction mission. As intelligence reports are sent to surface assets, 
UAS can be launched and vectored to localize and track any suspected drug trafficking 
vessel. During a 2015 U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (NAVSOUTH) Fleet 
Experiment, two UASs were deployed from the USNS Spearhead (EPF 1) supporting 
broader maritime C2 capabilities, Scan Eagle and the RQ-20A Puma.241 Experiment lead 
LT Mark Bote stated:  
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The idea of the dual-UAV operations was to determine how Puma and Scan 
Eagle could fit into potential adaptive force packages in the future and how 
to use the [EPF] in a more diverse way. What we were looking for with these 
UAVs to do is to help do especially the monitoring portion of that [counter-
trafficking] mission set, to help with ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance), to find and detect and then monitor the boats that are around 
the area.242 
Similar to the LCS platforms, the EPFs use of the Scan Eagle and Puma have 
different aviation capabilities. The Scan Eagle has an endurance time of 18 hours.243 In 
contrast, the Puma is limited in endurance with a total of 3+ hours to detect and monitor a 
suspected drug vessel and provide situational reports back to the home ship while the main 
interdiction ship is en route to the drug trafficking threat. Figure 14 illustrates the Scan 
Eagle; Figure 15 shows the Puma; and Table 7 presents a comparison between the two 
platforms.  
 
Figure 14. Scan Eagle Launched onboard USNS Spearhead244 
 
242 Loten-Beckford. 
243 “Scan Eagle,” Insitu, accessed May 23, 2021, https://www.insitu.com/products/scaneagle. 
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Element East, July 19, 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/4576753/usns-spearhead-scan-eagle-launch. 
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Figure 15. RQ-20A Puma245 
Table 7. Scan Eagle246 and Puma247 Specifications 
Specifications Scan Eagle Puma 
Length 5.6. ft. 4.6 ft. 
Wingspan 10.2 ft. 9.2 ft. 
Sensors/Data EO camera, Analog/digital video 
(encrypted), C2 Datalink 
(encrypted/unencrypted) 
EO/IR camera 
Endurance 18 hours 3+ hours 
Max Altitude 
Ceiling 
19,500 ft. 500 ft. 
Max Speed 80 knots 20 to 45 knots 
 
In addition to the Scan Eagle and Puma, during a 2013 operation, NAVSOUTH 
conducted a one-month demonstration with the Raven Aerostar Tethered Aerostat System 
onboard the HSV-2 Swift to meet a critical surveillance solution in the Caribbean Basin.248 
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Raven Aerostar program manager Craig Laws stated, “The HSV-2 pulled the aerostat over 
3,000 nautical miles during the course of downrange operations, topping out at a ship speed 
of 28 knots.”249 However, unfavorable weather conditions can make operating the 
Aerostat more difficult. For example, during a June 2014 exercise, an Aerostat deployed 
from the USNS Spearhead was damaged by lightning, causing it to deflate and crash in the 
ocean. As a result, the disabled Aerostat threatened to become a navigation safety hazard 
to other ships.250 Figure 16 depicts the Raven Aerostar Tethered Aerostat System onboard 
the HSV-2 Swift. 
 
Figure 16. Tethered Aerostat Radar System251 
In addition, the HSV-2 also simultaneously employed the Puma as an ISR platform 
during operations, using a system-of-systems approach. Information from the Aerostar and 
Puma can be shared with the JIATF-S, which coordinates interdiction assets and 
disseminates intelligence to Caribbean Basin partner nations. The Aerostar can generate 
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essential situational awareness across a large area. According to the Counternarcotics 
Program Manager/Unmanned Systems Commander NAVSOUTH Ted Venable, “By 
incorporating this system on a moving vessel, it provided a broad picture of the surface and 
air traffic around the HSV Swift.”252  
With such a large area in which to detect and monitor drug trafficking vessels, 
spanning both the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean, the EPF’s capability to 
launch various aviation assets like the LCS to generate a larger maritime picture is a game-
changer for SOUTHCOM. As soon as surface vessels receive intelligence alerts, 
SOUTHCOM can vector aircraft to the area to locate and monitor any potential drug 
trafficking vessels. The endurance of the Scan Eagle and Puma, combined with the 
Tethered Raven Aerostar, allow for more time in the air to fine tune the maritime picture, 
detect and track a suspected drug vessel, and provide situational updates back to the home 
ship while it is en route to the drug trafficking threat. However, unlike the LCS MH-60R, 
the Scan Eagle, Puma, and Aerostar cannot employ weapons.  
4. RHIB Employment 
Employing a RHIB is crucial for an interdiction ship as they are primarily utilized 
to interdict and board a suspected drug trafficking vessel. The EPF can deploy a 7-meter 
RHIB using the stern crane located behind the ship.253 However, the crane design for 
employing and recovering a RHIB results in a slow and dangerous process.254 Like the 
LCS, one RHIB is transported to the stern platform utilizing a moveable boat skid. Figure 
17 depicts that part of the launch process. 
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Figure 17. RHIB Launch from an EPF255 
The EPF’s large mission bay means storage capacity for multiple RHIBs. During 
the Southern Partnership Station 2017 (SPS 17) exercise across Central and South America, 
the USNS Spearhead was outfitted with only a secondary RHIB, demonstrating the 
importance of having additional RHIBs. A Navy lessons learned report revealed multiple 
times when having access to a secondary small boat would have proved helpful for the 
USNS Spearhead while conducting mission support operations, especially if the 
Spearhead’s SOLAS FRB (lifeboat) breaks down.256 The SOLAS FRB is specifically 
designated for a man overboard situation and for corralling the life rafts in an abandon ship 
scenario, not for mission support operations. 
However, unlike the LCS, deploying the RHIB requires no personnel on the RHIB 
while utilizing the crane. The cargo crane for RHIB launch and recovery is not certified for 
manned lift or operations greater than Sea State 2.257 Additionally, this increases the 
amount of time needed for the RHIBs to deploy with personnel on board as it has to be 
picked up and lowered into the water behind the ship, and then the crew members get on 
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via a ladder. The crane has the weight capacity to lift the RHIB with personnel but needs 
to be safety-certified or else receive a new crane for this to happen.258 
C. ANALYSIS 
Overall, the capabilities of the EPF do not render it a successful interdiction 
platform. The EPF’s lack of an onboard hangar significantly limits its capacity as a drug 
interdiction platform. In a 2018 7th Fleet Theater Security Cooperation exercise, the initial 
planning phase contemplated the feasibility of embarking a helicopter detachment on an 
EPF.259 The findings during the initial planning phase identified multiple issues, including 
the lack of maintenance spaces onboard for the helicopter detachment and the arrangement 
of the maintenance fly–away kit, which would require storing the kit in the mission bay, 
causing it to be hand-carried up two decks to reach the aircraft. Larger kit items, however, 
involve the use of the ship’s stern crane. Both situations would depend significantly on the 
sea state as to whether safe movement around the ship was safe. The 7th Fleet ultimately 
did not embark the helicopter detachment since the Required Operational Capabilities/
Projected Operating Environment (ROC/POE) for the EPF did not include long–term 
helicopter embarkation as an essential capability.260 Overall, the cost of embarking a 
helicopter does not outweigh its benefits. Exercise planners determined that embarking a 
helicopter and its detachment should not be a planning factor for future missions on an 
EPF.  
Additionally, the EPF stern crane situation severely limits RHIB and LEDET 
employment. Using the crane while deploying the RHIB can only happen if no personnel 
are onboard. Ultimately, this increases the time it takes for a RHIB to be deployed due to 
the crew members boarding it once it is placed in the water. This poses a safety issue to a 
LEDET on board. In addition, the stern crane is not authorized for operations in sea states 
greater than 2. 
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However, when looking at the D&M aspect of counterdrug operations, the EPF 
serves as a suitable platform when working with another platform. The SPS 17 exercise 
with USNS Spearhead showed that the EPF is not effective when employed as a stand-
alone D&M platform. While a Puma UAS successfully acquired suspected vessels, engine 
failure for the Puma during a D&M exercise in SPS 17 significantly reduced D&M 
capabilities for JIATF-S.261 Scan Eagle data utilized on the EPF is limited, but information 
regarding its use on a USCG platform reinforces the effectiveness of a UAS onboard. 
During a deployment with the USCG Bertholf, Coast Guard personnel operated a Scan 
Eagle, which aided in the successful interdiction of 600 kg of cocaine.262 Bertholf’s crew 
used the ScanEagle to acquire real-time surveillance and position data on a suspected go-
fast vessel. The UAS tracked down the target vessel and kept a continual eye on it until the 
MH-65D helicopter and RHIB came to intercept and detain the go-fast vessel crew.263 
Table 8 depicts the overall capabilities and deficiencies of the EPF-variant. 
Table 8. EPF and Interdiction Factors 
Factor EPF 
Speed + 
Aviation (Rotary) — 
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All in all, EPF capabilities do not make it an effective drug interdiction platform, 
but the EPF shows promise as a support platform for D&M. Although the EPF has a similar 
speed capability to the LCS, the aviation (rotary), RHIB, and HITRON deficiencies 
drastically reduce its effectiveness as an interdiction platform. However, with UAS 
onboard, such as the Puma and Scan Eagle, the EPF can be best utilized as an additional 
D&M platform while operating with an LCS.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
DTOs continue to endanger American lives and threaten U.S. national security in 
the Western Hemisphere. Their activities endanger regional stability and political 
legitimacy. Thousands of lives have been lost and billions of dollars have been spent in 
defeating this threat. Even as our tactics, strategy, and policy have evolved over the past 
five decades, and as many successes in counterdrug interdiction as we and our partner 
nations have had, we still struggle to keep pace with DTOs’ creative adaptability especially 
as regards the vessels they use to transit drugs into the United States. The Navy needs 
versatile, armed, high-speed interdiction ships capable of launching aircraft and sending 
Coast Guard boarding parties to intercept drug trafficking vessels as well as the capacity 
to immobilize potential drug boats from the air. This thesis examined policy, strategy, and 
the capabilities necessary to meet the counterdrug mission in the waters off Central and 
South America then weighed two platforms, the LCS and EPF, against those required 
capabilities. The thesis found the LCS to be a more complete interdiction platform, with 
one major drawback, while the EPF is only effective while working in tandem with a naval 
combatant platform. The conclusion summarizes main points, offers findings, and gives 
recommendations for policymakers’ consideration as well as for further research. 
What vessels are the DTOs using? The majority of illegal drugs in Central and 
South America are delivered to Mexico in single shipments through fishing trawlers. DTOs 
also use the go-fast platform, which provides a faster means to move narcotics over the 
open seas. Additionally, DTOs have developed multi-pronged techniques for maritime 
narcotics trafficking, rather than employing a fishing vessel for single cargos, like the narco 
torpedo method. Last but not least, DTOs have invested and will likely continue to invest 
in semi-submersible and fully submersible technology, with profit margins that make the 
production costs well worth it.  
Why does the Navy need a new solution for interdiction platforms? The vessels 
typically used, such as the OHP Frigate and PC, have reached the end of their operational 
lives. To fill the resulting operational gap in the SOUTHCOM AOR, the Navy has 
employed the DDG. However, in an era of great power competition, deploying the DDG 
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for drug interdiction operations may not be the most effective use of a naval vessel needed 
elsewhere, such as in the waters near Iran, Russia, and China. 
What are the concerns around using the LCS and EPF as reliable multi-purpose 
platforms appropriate for marine drug interdiction? Although both ship class have 
demonstrated success in the open ocean to detect, monitor, and interdict drug boats and 
submarines, concerns remain over their design, procurement, and survivability. Due to a 
design fault, previous EPF ships suffered bow damage on the high seas, making them 
vulnerable to wave smashes. Congress has constrained the Navy’s LCS production 
capacity, and the inventory has been lowered to maintain an open competition for the new 
frigate. Finally, neither the LCS nor EPF is intended to be combat-capable; therefore, 
neither would fulfill the multi-purpose criterion. The EPF was built as a cargo ship with 
little armor or weaponry while the LCS is not expected to operate and survive in a combat 
environment.  
A. FINDINGS 
The thesis’s analysis found that the LCS is more effective than the EPF in carrying 
out counterdrug operations in the waters off Central and South America. Both the 
Independence- and Freedom-variant LCS satisfy the requirements for a counterdrug 
mission’s goal. Like the OHP Frigates, the LCS platforms can provide Combatant 
Commanders, particularly SOUTHCOM, necessary capabilities for maritime drug 
interdiction. The known Freedom-variant engineering flaw makes the Independence-
variant a more capable platform for the various drug trafficking threats, but both LCS 
variants discussed here can conduct counterdrug operations.  
However, and this is a large however, the Navy will be taking an operational risk if 
the Freedom-variant operates at high speeds while its combining gear issue remains 
unmodified. The combining gear failure onboard USS Detroit (LCS 7) and USS Little Rock 
(LCS 9) counterdrug operations led to their early retirement,264 highlighting the 
importance of the speed capability in an interdiction platform. To avoid the flaw, the 
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Freedom-variant can operate only its diesel engines rather than the CODAG combination, 
but, by doing so, it can only reach speeds of 10 to 12 knots, significantly decreasing 
interdiction capabilities against the go-fast boat. Additionally, its speed limitations mean it 
will be slow to arrive at an operating area. The Freedom-variant can pursue the fishing and 
submersible threats, but it is out of luck against a go-fast boat and will be slow to respond 
to a drug trafficking event.  
The EPF’s capabilities are insufficient to make it a viable interdiction platform. It 
cannot embark an organic helicopter due to a lack of an onboard hangar, and, due to the 
stern crane situation, the use of a RHIB and LEDET is significantly restricted in sea states 
greater than two. As a result of the crew members boarding the RHIB after being placed in 
the water, deployment time may increase.  
However, the EPF serves as a suitable platform for D&M when working with 
another platform. The SPS 17 exercise with the USNS Spearhead showed both the EPF’s 
ineffectiveness as a stand-alone interdiction platform and also that using a ScanEagle UAS 
onboard successfully acquired information regarding suspected drug trafficking vessels. 
While Scan Eagle data use by EPFs is limited, information regarding its use on a Coast 
Guard platform reinforces the effectiveness of a UAS onboard in D&M. The ScanEagle 
UAS acquired real-time surveillance and position data on a suspected go-fast vessel. The 
UAS tracked down the target vessel and kept a continual eye on it until an aviation asset 
and RHIB intercepted and detained the go-fast crew. Table 9 lists the comparisons between 
the LCS and EPF. 
Table 9. Comparison Results 
Factor Independence Freedom EPF 
Speed + — + 
Aviation (Rotary) + + — 
Aviation (UAS) + + + 
RHIB + + — 
LEDET + + — 
HITRON + + — 
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B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The thesis’s analysis was somewhat limited due to limited open-source information 
and also lack of employment of the EPF platform in the SOUTHCOM AOR. There have 
only been three instances where the class was utilized in the region, two of which involved 
counterdrug testing and the other as a tender for an LCS.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis offers two recommendations for consideration: 
1. Correct the engineering problems in the LCS Freedom-variants, and 
2. Use the LCS as the lead ship for counterdrug operations with the EPF 
serving alongside as a D&M platform.  
The LCS should launch and retrieve multiple unmanned aerial vehicles as well as 
helicopters. The LCS ability to remotely operate a UAV would expand the LCS sensor 
reach in the operational region, depending on the mission scope. By revealing contacts or 
targets at a distance from the LCS, this asset would improve the overall operational picture. 
This airborne capability would aid SOUTHCOM in managing asset location. For example, 
an LCS may remain in one area and patrol while the UAV is launched to patrol another 
location. As it receives intelligence, the LCS can speed to the operating area quickly. As 
more LCS platforms enter the fleet, this concept would provide a broader surveillance 
image of the functioning area while also reducing fuel use, allowing for a longer stay time. 
 Using the EPF as a support ship for the LCS would best leverage the capabilities 
from these two platforms to increase overall effectiveness. For example, the effectiveness 
of both a helicopter and UAS/UAV is substantially increased when two ships are air-
capable. When one ship’s helicopter is in the air, the second ship can function as a 
secondary “lily pad,” allowing for an increase of an aircraft’s operational range. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
Further research is needed into the LCS concerning maintenance, engineering, and 
endurance. The problems of the LCS are a growing concern for both senior military and 
political officials, as discussed in Chapters I and III. In addition, the Navy recently 
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experimented with the concept of an EPF serving as an LCS tender, similar to the Emory 
S. Land tender class involving the USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) and USNS Burlington 
(EPF 10).265 As more EPFs support SOUTHCOM, further research can be done to 
determine the viability of an EPF serving as a tender platform to support an LCS in the 
SOUTHCOM AOR and its effects in the Western Hemisphere. 
E. CONCLUSION 
To replace the OHP Frigates, the LCS was designed to be a multi-mission ship 
similar to the frigate, with the capacity to “plug-and-fight” multiple mission modules 
focusing on ASW, SUW, and MIW, as well as unmanned vehicles. Both the Independence 
and Freedom-variants have had significant engineering failures, resulting in millions of 
dollars in repair expenditures to return these ships to operation. Despite the program’s 
failure, the LCS platforms have effectively executed the drug interdiction mission. The 
LCS in the SOUTHCOM AOR provides a capability and technology edge against DTOs 
in the open ocean. With the LCS’s speed, maneuverability, and aviation support, the 
platform has no issues intercepting drug trafficking vessels in the Western Hemisphere. A 
proven, steady, and lethal combatant is essential for counterdrug operations. The LCS is 
the most established and reasonable choice for such operations. It is critical for the LCS to 
carry out counterdrug anti-narcotics operations in an era of great power competition.  
The Navy needs to be creative in employing the LCS and EPF, based on the 
suitability and trade-offs presented in Chapters III and IV. The various DTOs across 
Central and South America will continue to traffic drugs worldwide when a drug is deemed 
illegal, as there will always be a profit to be made. Also, DTOs’ sophistication and 
creativity in drug trafficking vessels have evolved and will likely continue to do so.  
The Navy must continue to provide assets to the Western Hemisphere for the United 
States to have a substantial impact on drug trafficking in the maritime domain, focusing on 
the LCS and EPF platforms. As great power competition continues to grow worldwide, 
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other naval assets such as cruisers or destroyers, which are often tasked in drug interdiction, 
are needed for primary missions in the waters near Russia, China, and Iran. The capability 
of the LCS and EPF platforms in integrated operations to support the requirements for 
counterdrug operations expands the options of military commanders. The LCS and EPF 
platforms will likely become the most prominent and ubiquitous emblems of the United 
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